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The right kind of content for a physicalist about color

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2003

Paul Skokowski*
Affiliation:
Symbolic Systems and Philosophy Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305-2155http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~paulsko

Abstract:

Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne & Hilbert (B&H). Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to nonhuman animals suspect.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Commentary on Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color realism and color science. BBS 26(1):3–21.

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