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Seeing Objects and Surfaces, and the ‘In Virtue Of’ Relation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2004

Scott Campbell
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham

Abstract

Frank Jackson in Perception uses the ‘in virtue of’ relation to ground the distinction between direct and indirect perception. He argues that it follows that our perception of physical objects is mediated by perceiving their facing surfaces, and so is indirect. I argue that this is false. Seeing a part of an object is in itself a seeing of the object; there is no indirectness involved. Hence, the ‘in virtue of’ relation is an inadequate basis for the direct-indirect distinction. I also argue that claims that we don't, ‘strictly speaking’, see objects, are also false.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2004

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