Utilitas

Utilitas (2004), 16:2:168-183 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2004 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0953820804000512

SYMPOSIUM ON J. B. SCHNEEWIND'S PHILOSOPHY

Sidgwick's Conception of Ethics


JOHN DEIGH a1c1
a1 University of Texas at Austin

Article author query
deigh j   [Google Scholar] 
 

Abstract

J. B. Schneewind's Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy surpassed all previous treatments of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics by showing how Sidgwick's work follows a coherent plan of argument for a conception of ethics as grounded in practical reason. Schneewind offered his interpretation as the product of a historical rather than a critical study. This article undertakes a critical study of Sidgwick's work based on Schneewind's interpretation. Its thesis is that the conception of ethics for which Sidgwick argued is incoherent. As a result, it is argued, the coherent plan of argument in the Methods that Schneewind disclosed masks a deep incoherence in the argument itself.


Correspondence:
c1 jdeigh@mail.law.utexas.edu


null