Behavioral and Brain Sciences



Continuing Commentary
Commentary on Arthur M. Glenberg (1997). What memory is for. BBS 20(1):1–19.

The problem of content in embodied memory


Martin Kurthen a1, Thomas Grunwald a1, Christoph Helmstaedter a1 and Christian E. Elger a1
a1 Department of Epileptology, University of Bonn, D-53105 Bonn, Germany Martin.Kurthen@ukb.uni-bonn.de http//www.uni-bonn.de/epileptologie/index.html

Abstract

An action-oriented theory of embodied memory is favorable for many reasons, but it will not provide a quick yet clean solution to the grounding problem in the way Glenberg (1997t) envisages. Although structural mapping via analogical representations may be an adequate mechanism of cognitive representation, it will not suffice to explain representation as such.



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