The Journal of Politics

Articles

Corporate Influence and the Regulatory Mandate

Sanford C. Gordona1 and Catherine Hafera1

a1 New York University

Abstract

Industries face collective action and commitment problems when attempting to influence Congress. At the same time, an individual firm's political investments can yield reduced bureaucratic scrutiny by indicating that firm's willingness to contest agency decisions. We develop a model in which the desirability of maintaining a political footprint for this reason enables individual firms to commit to rewarding elected officials who maintain laws benefiting an entire industry. Our “dual forbearance” model anticipates that corporate political investments will be larger on average when statutes are stringent and that even pro-industry legislative coalitions will benefit politically from the existence of a minimal regulatory state.

(Online publication April 10 2006)

(Accepted June 16 2006)

Sanford Clark Gordon is assistant professor of politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003.

Catherine Hafer is assistant professor of politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003.

Metrics