THINKING CONSTITUTIONALLY: THE PROBLEM OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Stephen L.
Elkin
a1
a1 Government and Politics, University of
Maryland
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A variety of arguments have been advanced that deliberation should be
at the center of any good political regime in which there is popular
self-government. Deliberation is to be the basis for lawmaking, that
is, for the making of the collectivity's binding decisions. Thus,
John Rawls says, “[O]f course, actual constitutions
should be designed as far as possible to make the same determinations
as the ideal legislative procedure.” This procedure, in turn, is
defined as having laws that result from “rational legislators
… who are conscientious, trying to follow the principles of
justice as their standard.” These legislators “are not to
take a narrow or group-interested standpoint.” Joshua Cohen
broadly agrees with Rawls and characterizes Rawls's view as one
that argues for a democratic politics that is built around public
deliberation. Cohen says (agreeing with Rawls) that “an ideal
pluralist scheme, in which democratic politics consists of fair
bargaining among groups each of which pursues its particular or
sectional interest, is unsuited to a just society.” John Dryzek
shares these views and comments that the “essence of democratic
legitimacy should be sought … in the ability of all individuals
subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation
about that decision.” Others have argued along similar lines,
including James Bohman, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, David
Gauthier, and Jurgen Habermas.
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