Michael E. Bratman a1 a1 Philosophy, Stanford University
In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the
action. But what is it for the agent herself to direct and to
govern? One theme in a series of articles by Harry G. Frankfurt
is that we can make progress in answering this question by appeal
to higher-order
conative
attitudes. Frankfurt's
original version of this idea is that in acting of one's own
free will, one is not acting simply because one desires so to act.
Rather, it is also true that this desire motivates one's
action because one desires that this desire motivate one's
action. This latter desire about the motivational role of one's
desire is a second-order desire. It is, in particular, what Frankfurt
calls a second-order “volition.” And, according to
Frankfurt's original proposal, acting of one's own free
will involves in this way such second-order, and sometimes yet higher
order, volitions.
