CJO - Abstract - Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory

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American Political Science Review (2003), 97 : 551-565 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2003 by the American Political Science Association
doi:10.1017/S000305540300087X (About doi)
Published online by Cambridge University Press 29 Dec 2003
 
American Political Science Review (2003), 97:4:551-565 American Political Science Association
Copyright © 2003 by the American Political Science Association
doi:10.1017/S000305540300087X

ARTICLES

Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory

PAUL K. MacDONALD a1c1
a1 Columbia University

Abstract

Rational choice theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions, and for this reason, their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent, contradictory, and unpersuasive. To remedy this problem, I describe how two of the main positions in the philosophy of science, instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism, act as competing epistemological foundations for rational choice theory. I illustrate how these philosophical perspectives help political scientists (1) understand what is at stake in the theoretical debates surrounding the rationality assumption, self-interest, and methodological individualism, (2) identify inconsistencies in the epistemological positions adopted by rational choice theorists, and (3) assess the feasibility and desirability of a universal theory based on the rationality assumption.


Correspondence:
c1 Ph.D. candidate, Columbia University, Political Science Department, 7th Floor International Affairs Building, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 (pm337@columbia.edu).

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