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The Constitutionalization of the International Legal Order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2008

SUSAN C. BREAU
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Extract

A continuing debate within international law research is whether there is an emerging international constitutional order. This journal devoted an issue to this discussion and there have been a number of books and articles written on the subject. Indeed, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has recently joined the debate by writing an essay entitled (in the English translation) ‘Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?’ The essay reminds the reader of constitutionalism's original philosophical roots in Kantian cosmopolitanism. Habermas argues that the world dominated by nation-states ‘is indeed in transition towards the postnational constellation of a global society’. He contrasts this vision with the realist opinion that the taming of political power through law is only possible within a sovereign state and with a more recent view postulating a vision of a liberal world order under the banner of Pax Americana. In support of the Habermas position, it can be argued that as a result of the UN 60th Anniversary Summit's adoption of the international norm of ‘the responsibility to protect’, there is a trend towards constitutional values in our international system. As Anne Peters states, ‘[t]he most fundamental norms might represent global constitutional law.’

Type
REVIEW ESSAY
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 545 - 561
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2008

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References

1. Contributions by A. Peters, E. de Wet and E.-U. Petersmann in (2006) 19 LJIL 579, at 579–667; and see von Bogdandy, A., ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany’, (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 223Google Scholar.

2. J. Habermas, The Divided West (2006), 115–93.

3. Ibid., at 115.

4. Ibid., at 116; and see M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (2003).

5. 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60 (2005), para. 139.

6. A. Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’, (2006) 19 LJIL 579, at 586.

7. Dupuy, P.-M., ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 1, at 3Google Scholar.

8. See Habermas, supra note 2, at 115.

9. C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’, (1999) 281 RCADI 10; and Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against Their Will’, (1993) 241 RCADI 195; and see A. von Bogdandy, supra note 1, in which he discusses the roots of Tomuschat's theories in the writings of Verdross and Mosler.

10. Noortmann discusses regime theory and the three leading publications in this theory of international relations, which are R. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984 and 2005); A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (1997), and S. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (1983).

11. Among her publications on international networks are ‘Networking Goes International: An Update’, (2006) 2 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 211; ‘The Global Governance Crisis’, (2006) 4 Interdependent 2006; ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’, (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 283; ‘A Global Community of Courts’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 1.

12. J. Habermas, supra note 2, at 115–16.

13. C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law’ and ‘Obligations’, supra note 9.

14. See for example the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at 257, para. 79, with respect to International Humanitarian Law; and the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, at 172, para. 88, and at 199, para. 155, referring to self-determination and international humanitarian law.

15. C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations’, supra note 9, at 211.

16. Ibid., at 211.

17. Ibid., at 211–12.

18. Ibid., at 217.

19. Ibid., at 236.

20. B. Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’, in R. MacDonald and D. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (2005), 837; and see Fassbender, B., ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’, (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529Google Scholar.

21. See Fassbender, ‘Meaning’, supra note 19, at 848.

22. N. Wheeler, Saving Strangers (2000), 6.

23. Ibid., at 11–12; and H. Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in H. Butterfield and M. Wights (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (1966), at 51–74.

24. R. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy (1984).

25. Throughout the book Noortmann uses five different case studies. These are (i) the India–Pakistan hijacking incident (1971); (ii) the Air Services Agreement dispute between France and the United States (1978); (iii) the Tehran Hostages crisis; (iv) the Nicaragua–United States conflict (1981–90); and (v) the destruction of Korean Airlines flight 007 (1983).

26. Krasner, supra note 10, at 2.

27. A. Hurrell, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach’, in R. J. Beck, A. Clark Arend and R. Vander Lugt (eds.), International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations (1996), 206.

28. R. Keohane, After Hegemony (edition with updated foreword) (2005); Krasner, supra note 10; Hasenclever, supra note 10.

29. R. Keohane, ‘After Hegemony’, supra note 27, at xi.

30. B. Fassbender, ‘Meaning’, supra note 19, at 848.

31. A. Chayes and A. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995), 4.

32. C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law’ and ‘Obligations’, supra note 9; and B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’, (1994) 250 RCADI 229.

33. M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (2000).

34. A. Slaughter, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’, in ibid., at 177.

35. M. Perrin de Brichambaut, ‘The Role of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System’, in ibid., at 269; V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System’, ibid., at 277; and G. Nolte, ‘The Limits of the Security Council's Powers and Its Functions in the International Legal System: Some Reflections’, in ibid., at 315.

36. B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto (1998), Introduction.

37. Ibid., ch. 10.

38. See particularly the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004); and K. Annan, In Larger Freedom (2005); but see also the Outcome document of the 60th Anniversary Summit which adopted only a few of the recommendations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60 (2005).

39. UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2002).

40. A. Cassese, International Law (2005), ‘“Aggravated” State Responsibility’, 262–77.

41. J. Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002); see ‘Introduction’ at 1–60 for a history of the Articles on State Responsibility.

42. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 14, at 200, para. 159.

43. There are now 104 countries states parties to the ICC Statute.

44. UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).

45. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 37.

46. Ibid., para. 139.

47. Advisory Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Humanitarian Intervention (2001); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001); Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 37; Annan, supra note 37.

48. UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (2006).

49. UN Doc. S/RES/1769 (2007).

50. Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region, dated 30 November 2006, given to the author by Chaloka Beyani of the London School of Economics.

51. S. Breau, ‘The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping’, (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 429.

52. For a summary of the work of the committee see http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/, and for its mandate see UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).

53. A. Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism Revisited’, presented at the seminar ‘ASIL Centennial Discussion on a Just World under Law: Why Obey International Law?’, held at University of Baltimore, available at http://law.ubalt.edu/asil/peters.html, last visited 31 December 2006.

54. (2006) 19 LJIL 579.

55. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 53.

56. There is certainly a body of literature opposing these views; see, e.g., Klabbers, J., ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, (2004)1 International Organizations Law Review 31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57. This discussion will be continued in the upcoming monograph on this subject.