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Response to Mumford and another definition of miracles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2003

STEVE CLARKE
Affiliation:
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, LPO Box A260, ANU, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia

Abstract

Stephen Mumford concludes a recent paper in Religious Studies, in which he advances a new causation-based analysis of miracles, by stating that the onus is ‘on rival accounts of miracles to produce something that matches it’. I take up Mumford's challenge, defending an intention-based definition of miracles, which I developed earlier, that he criticizes. I argue that this definition of miracles is more consistent with ordinary intuitions about miracles than Mumford's causation-based alternative. I further argue that Mumford has failed to demonstrate any advantages that his approach to miracles has over an intention-based approach.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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