Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2007 - Volume 30, Issue 5-6  

Open Peer Commentary

Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention

Christof Kocha1 and Naotsugu Tsuchiyaa2

a1 Division of Biology, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125

a2 Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Psychology and Neuroscience, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91125. koch.christof@gmail.com http://klab.caltech.edu/~koch/naotsu@gmail.com http://www.emotion.caltech.edu/~naotsu/Site/index.html

Abstract

We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.

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