Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2007 - Volume 30, Issue 5-6  

Open Peer Commentary

Do we see more than we can access?

Alex Byrnea1, David R. Hilberta2 and Susanna Siegela3

a1 Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02319

a2 Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, MC 267, Chicago, IL 60607

a3 Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Emerson Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. abyrne@mit.edu http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www hilbert@uic.edu www.uic.edu/~hilbert ssiegel@fas.harvard.edu http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel

Abstract

One of Block's conclusions, motivated by partial-report superiority experiments, is that there is phenomenally conscious information that is not cognitively accessible. We argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data.

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