Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2007 - Volume 30, Issue 5-6  

Open Peer Commentary

Access to phenomenality: A necessary condition of phenomenality?

Katalin Baloga1

a1 Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8306. katalin.balog@yale.edu http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kb237

Abstract

Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience show that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I argue that while Block's thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block's argument.

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    Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience Ned Block Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY 10003 ned.block@nyu.edu