Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2007 - Volume 30, Issue 5-6  

Open Peer Commentary

On the relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning

Barbara A. Spellmana1 and Dieynaba G. Ndiayea1

a1 Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4400. Spellman@virginia.edu Dgn2 h@virginia.edu http://people.virginia.edu/~bas6g/

Abstract

We critique the distinction Byrne makes between strong causes and enabling conditions, and its implications, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, we believe that the difference is psychological, not logical. Second, we disagree that there is a strict “dichotomy between the focus of counterfactual and causal thoughts.” Third, we disagree that it is easier for people to generate causes than counterfactuals.

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