Phenomenology, context, and self-experience in schizophrenia
Louis A. Sass a1andPeter J. Uhlhaas a2
a1 Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 08854-8085
lsass@rci.rutgers.edugsappweb.rutgers.edu/gsappweb/sass a2 Center for Computational and Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA England
uhlhaas@hotmail.com
Abstract
Impairments in cognitive coordination in schizophrenia are supported by phenomenological data that suggest deficits in the processing of visual context. Although the target article is sympathetic to such a phenomenological perspective, we argue that the relevance of phenomenological data for a wider understanding of consciousness in schizophrenia is not sufficiently addressed by the authors.
