CJO - Abstract - Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies

Cambridge Journals Online

Cambridge Journals Online
American Political Science Review (2003), 97 : 379-390 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2003 by the American Political Science Association
doi:10.1017/S0003055403000753 (About doi)
Published online by Cambridge University Press 27 Aug 2003
American Political Science Review (2003), 97:3:379-390 American Political Science Association
Copyright © 2003 by the American Political Science Association
doi:10.1017/S0003055403000753

ARTICLES

Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies


SHAHEEN MOZAFFAR a1, JAMES R. SCARRITT a2 and GLEN GALAICH a3
a1 Professor of Political Science at Bridgewater State College and Research Fellow of the African Studies Center, Boston University. Address: Department of Political Science, Bridgewater State College, Bridgewater, MA 02325 (smozaffar@bridgew.edu).
a2 Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Faculty Research Associate in the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder. Address: Department of Political Science. 333 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309-0333 (James.Scarritt@colorado.edu).
a3 doctoral candidate in Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder. Address: 38 Westgate Way, San Anselmo, CA 94960 (ggalaich@wacsf.org).

Abstract

Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems separately or jointly? We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the number of electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables (district magnitude and proximity of presidential and legislative elections), one intervening variable (effective number of presidential candidates), and two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups (fragmentation and concentration). Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However, the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest amount of variance in the number of parties. These results emphasize the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems, with important implications for the stability of Africa's emerging democracies in which parties are weak and multiethnic coalitions are fluid.



Footnotes

The National Science Foundation provided financial support (Grant SBER-9515439; Shaheen Mozaffar, Principal Investigator) for the larger project from which this article is drawn. Scarritt supervised the data collection on ethnopolitical groups and Mozaffar supervised the data collection on elections, electoral systems, and party systems. Adrian Prentice Hull of Jackson State University and Michelle Camou and Eitan Schiffman of the University of Colorado at Boulder provided invaluable assistance in the coding of ethnopolitical groups. For many helpful comments on early drafts, the authors thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers, as well as Fabian Camacho, Gary Cox, Ted Gurr, Richard Katz, David Leblang, Arend Lijphart, Tom Mayer, Susan McMillan, Kathleen O'Doherty, Dan Posner, Donald Rothchild, and members of the Globalization and Democratization colloquium at the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder. Mozaffar thanks the Boston University African Studies Center for continued research support. The data set for the article is available at http://webhost.bridgew.edu/smozaffar/. Final responsibility for the article rests with the authors.



Cambridge University Press