¹ Steven R. Reed, ‘Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case’, British Journal of Political Science 29 (1990): 335–356.

² Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 5.

³ Cox, Making Votes Count, ch. 4.

⁴ Reed, ‘Structure and Behaviour’.

⁵ John Fu-sheng Hsieh and Richard Niemi, ‘Can Duverger's Law Be Extended to SNTV? The Case of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan Elections’, Electoral Studies 18, 1 (1999): 101–116.

⁶ Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niou, ‘Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan’, Comparative Politics 26, 2 (1994): 221–236.

⁷ Gary W. Cox, ‘Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Nontransferable Vote’, American Political Science Review 88, 3 (1994): 608–21.

⁸ Reed, ‘Structure and Behaviour.’

⁹ Gary W. Cox and Matthew S. Shugart, ‘Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12, 2 (1995): 299–324.

¹⁰ Gary W. Cox, ‘Comment on “Japan's Multimember SNTV System and Strategic Voting: The ‘M + 1’ Rule and Beyond”,’ Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, 2 (2001): 237–239 (237).

¹¹ The New Party was almost wiped out in 2001, winning only one seat. In 2004, the NP agreed to run seven of its eight candidates under the KMT's party label, with only its lone incumbent running (in a single-seat district) as an official NP candidate. The other seven NP candidates were officially KMT candidates: their party was listed as ‘KMT’ on the official ballot, their votes counted toward the KMT's party list. However, the KMT only allowed four of the seven to participate in its vote-rationing scheme. In this paper, I only consider those four NP candidates to be KMT candidates.

¹² Of the 31 districts, four have only one seat. No organization published a poll in the two aboriginal districts. UDN did not publish polls in Ilan or Hualien Counties.

¹³ An alternate way of defining this variable would be to take the candidate's margin over the mth-placed candidate, since that would indicate how much support the candidate could lose and still win election. I do not adopt this approach, however, since I am investigating strategic voting taking place within parties. I assume that the goal of the parties and their supporters is to equalize support among all the party nominees. Because of this, it is appropriate to examine the excess margin over the weakest party nominee rather than over the mth-placed candidate.

¹⁴ Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

¹⁵ Gary W. Cox and Frances Rosenbluth, ‘Reducing Nomination Errors: Factional Competition and Party Strategy in Japan’, Electoral Studies 13, 1 (1994): 4–16. Cox and Niou, ‘Seat Bonuses.’

¹⁶ Since inclusion in this data set requires multiple surveys by the same organization, many districts are not represented. In particular, large urban districts are overrepresented. However, these are precisely the districts in which we might expect strategic voting to be most prevalent, since party identification is stronger, personal ties are weaker, and more polling information is available. Moreover, since parties’ support varies, there is a wide variety in the numbers of nominees in these districts. In short, if regression to the mean drives the results, it should be evident in these districts.

¹⁷ United Daily News, 30 November 2004.

¹⁸ United Daily News, 7 December 2004.

¹⁹ United Daily News, 13 December 2004.

²⁰ In order to compare rankings across districts with different numbers of nominees, I set the lowest ranked candidate to zero, the highest ranked candidate to one, and spaced the others at equal intervals between them.

²¹ Hawang, Shiou-duan, Constituency Service: How Legislators See the Foundations for Re-election. (in Chinese) (Tonsan: Taipei, 1994), p. 112.

²² Bouissou, Jean-Marie, ‘Organizing One's Support Base under the SNTV: The Case of Japanese Koenkai’, in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution, Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall, eds (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 103.

²³ Stephen M. Swindle, ‘The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications of Collective Electoral Incentives’, Party Politics 8, 3 (2002): 279–300 (292).

²⁴ Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 133–134.

²⁵ Hans H. Baerwald, Party Politics in Japan (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 45–49.

²⁶ These deviations could also be produced if the party's support varied significantly from one area to another. However, in practice, there is much greater geographic variation in individual candidates’ support than in parties’ support.

²⁷ Nathan F. Batto, ‘Electoral Strategy, Committee Membership, and Rent-Seeking in the Taiwanese Legislature, 1992–2001’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 30, 1 (1995): 43–62. This measure is based on the chi-square statistic, comparing a candidate's vote in each precinct to his or her district-wide vote share and summing the deviations. This sum is divided by a theoretical maximum to produce a measure of how concentrated the candidate's vote is, given how concentrated it could theoretically be.

²⁸ Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth, ‘Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in Japan’, in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Masahiko Tatebayashi and Margaret A. McKean, ‘Vote Division and Policy Differentiation Strategies of LDP members under SNTV/MMD in Japan’, Presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, DC.

²⁹ Bouissou, ‘Organizing One's Support Base’.

³⁰ Cox and Rosenbluth, ‘Reducing Nomination Errors’.

³¹ Akira Hayama, ‘Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections’, Electoral Studies 11, 1 (1992): 46–57.