International Organization

The Rational Design of International Institutions

The Rational Design of International Institutions

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal

Abstract

Why do international institutions vary so widely in terms of such key institutional features as membership, scope, and flexibility? We argue that international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. In this article we introduce the theoretical framework of the Rational Design project. We identify five important features of institutions—membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility—and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. We draw on rational choice theory to develop a series of empirically falsifiable conjectures that explain this institutional variation. The authors of the articles in this special issue of International Organization evaluate the conjectures in specific issue-areas and the overall Rational Design approach.

Barbara Koremenos is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. She can be reached at koremeno@polisci.ucla.edu.

Charles Lipson is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. He can be reached at lipson@uchicago.edu.

Duncan J. Snidal is Associate Professor in the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. He can be reached at snidal@uchicago.edu.