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MARGINS OF APPRECIATION: CULTURAL RELATIVITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Extract

The number of states participating in the Council of Europe's system for the protection of human rights has grown rapidly over recent years. Established in 1949 with an initial membership of 10 states, the Council has now grown to a membership of 46,2 dwarfing the EU in its geographical reach. The most significant period of enlargement has been since the end of the Cold War as the formerly Communist states from central and eastern Europe flocked to the Council of Europe seeking assistance with the process of democratisation. The Council's most prominent human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, has entered into force for all but one of the 46 member states.3 This paper questions whether the European Court of Human Rights' recognition of a national ‘margin of appreciation’ has allowed these new Contracting Parties too much leeway in the way they choose to protect, or more specifically, to limit, the exercise of human rights.

Type
Shorter Articles, Comments, and Notes
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2005

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References

1 Elements of this article were delivered as a paper at the McCoubrey Centre for International Law, University of Hull, in November 2003. The research presented is derived from doctoral work completed at the University of Hull under the supervision of Dr W John Hopkins, Dr Lindsay Moir and the late Prof Hilaire McCoubrey; Sweeney, , ‘Margins of appreciation, cultural relativity and the European Court of Human Rights’ (PhD thesis on file at the University of Hull). Thanks also to Prof Ian Ward at Newcastle Law School who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this article.Google Scholar

2 ‘The Council of Europe's Member States’ (Council of Europe) <www.coe.int/T/e/com/about_coe/member_states/default.asp> (last visited 14 10 2004). The most recent state to join was Monaco on the 5 October 2004.+(last+visited+14+10+2004).+The+most+recent+state+to+join+was+Monaco+on+the+5+October+2004.>Google Scholar

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39 Ibid paras 25–6. The government also contended that their aim was to protect the ‘reputation and rights of others’, namely the municipal guards. Having examined the facts of the case and the reasoning of the domestic courts, the European Court felt the aim of preventing disorder was the dominant aim.

40 Ibid para 27.

41 It must be noted that the Commission was split 8/7 in favour a finding a violation of the Convention. There was therefore a significant minority of Commissioners that felt the boundaries of the state's margin had not been overstepped in this case: Janowski v Poland (Application 25716/94) (1997) (ECommHR).Google Scholar

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71 Mahoney, Cf PMarvellous richness of diversity or invidious cultural relativism‘ (1998) 19(1) Human Rights Law Journal 1 who describes the margin itself in these terms.Google Scholar

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