Letting Scotus Speak for Himself
In “The Unmitigated Scotus,” Thomas Williams calls for another, better reading of the Subtle Doctor: one in which he is able to “speak for himself.” 1 In this and other articles, Williams criticizes recent Scotist scholarship for its misguided attempt to save Scotus from “the unpalatable position” he actually held, that is, a libertarian voluntarist divine command moral philosophy. 2 He presents his position as one that, finally, allows Scotus to speak for himself.
1 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80. Bd, 1998, p. 162.
2 Thomas Williams, “How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 425–46; Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” The Modern Schoolman, 74 (1997): 73–94; Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 193–215.