Medieval Philosophy and Theology



Letting Scotus Speak for Himself


MARY BETH INGHAM a1
a1 Loyola Marymount University

In “The Unmitigated Scotus,” Thomas Williams calls for another, better reading of the Subtle Doctor: one in which he is able to “speak for himself.” 1 In this and other articles, Williams criticizes recent Scotist scholarship for its misguided attempt to save Scotus from “the unpalatable position” he actually held, that is, a libertarian voluntarist divine command moral philosophy. 2 He presents his position as one that, finally, allows Scotus to speak for himself.



Footnotes

1 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80. Bd, 1998, p. 162.

2 Thomas Williams, “How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 425–46; Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” The Modern Schoolman, 74 (1997): 73–94; Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 193–215.