CJO - Abstract - Exploring the Bargaining Model of War

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Perspectives on Politics (2003), 1 : 27-43 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2003 by the American Political Science Association
doi:10.1017.S1537592703000033 (About doi)
Published online by Cambridge University Press 09 Jan 2004
 
Perspective on Politics (2003), 1:1:27-43 American Political Science Association
Copyright © 2003 by the American Political Science Association
doi:10.1017/S1537592703000033

ARTICLES

Exploring the Bargaining Model of War

Dan Reiter a1
a1 associate (Winship research) professor of political science at Emory University (dreiter@emory.edu)

Abstract

The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism.


Footnotes

For comments, he thanks Risa Brooks, Hein Goemans, Ted Hopf, Robert Powell, Bruce Russett, Alastair Smith, Allan Stam, and Suzanne Werner. He would like to note that any remaining errors are exclusively his own.


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