Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Dan Reiter a1
a1 associate (Winship research) professor of political science at Emory University (dreiter@emory.edu)
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AbstractThe bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism.
Footnotes For comments, he thanks Risa Brooks, Hein Goemans, Ted Hopf, Robert Powell, Bruce Russett, Alastair Smith, Allan Stam, and Suzanne Werner. He would like to note that any remaining errors are exclusively his own.
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