a1 Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/index.htm
a2 Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris I, and CNRS/ENS – UMR 8590, 75006 Paris, France email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.stat.psu.edu/people/faculty/smousavi.html/
The conclusions of Barbey & Sloman (B&S) crucially depend on evidence for different representations of statistical information. Unfortunately, a muddled distinction made among these representations calls into question the authors' conclusions. We clarify some notions of statistical representations which are often confused in the literature. These clarifications, combined with new empirical evidence, do not support a dual-process model of judgment.