Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Open Peer Commentary

A statistical taxonomy and another “chance” for natural frequencies

Adrien Bartona1a2, Shabnam Mousavia1a3 and Jeffrey R. Stevensa1

a1 Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; barton@mpib-berlin.mpg.de http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/index.htm

a2 Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris I, and CNRS/ENS – UMR 8590, 75006 Paris, France mousavi@mpib-berlin.mpg.de sxm70@psu.edu http://www.stat.psu.edu/people/faculty/smousavi.html/

a3 Department of Statistics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802. jstevens@mpib-berlin.mpg.de http://www.abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/users/jstevens/

Abstract

The conclusions of Barbey & Sloman (B&S) crucially depend on evidence for different representations of statistical information. Unfortunately, a muddled distinction made among these representations calls into question the authors' conclusions. We clarify some notions of statistical representations which are often confused in the literature. These clarifications, combined with new empirical evidence, do not support a dual-process model of judgment.

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