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Neural correlates of consciousness are not pictorial representations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

Geraint Rees  and
Chris Frith
Geraint Rees
Affiliation:
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdomg.rees@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~grees
Chris Frith
Affiliation:
Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdomc.frith@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/principals.html
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Abstract

O'Regan & Noë (O&N) are pessimistic about the prospects for discovering the neural correlates of consciousness. They argue that there can be no one-to-one correspondence between awareness and patterns of neural activity in the brain, so a project attempting to identify the neural correlates of consciousness is doomed to failure. We believe that this degree of pessimism may be overstated; recent empirical data show some convergence in describing consistent patterns of neural activity associated with visual consciousness.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 5 , October 2001 , pp. 999 - 1000
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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