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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 April 2016
The article argues that, by bringing a number of changes of systemic proportions in the order of international law, the internationalization of national constitutional human rights law has led to the ‘constitutionalization’ of international law. To build that argument, the paper first critically assesses the constitutionalization narrative. To that end it explains the reasons for its agnostic stance vis-à-vis the constitutionalization narrative and highlights the fact that international law has always contained some general, “constitutional” features that are particular to its systemic physiognomy. The article then explains how human rights law, as a special branch of international law, expands beyond the so-called humanization of international law narrative, acting as an important ingredient in a number of other narratives such as the constitutionalization of international law and the ones that are comparable to it, like legal pluralism and fragmentation. As to the systemic changes the internationalization of human rights has brought to the order of public international law, the examples given are those of collective enforcement at the decentralized level for the protection of common interests/values, sui generis normative hierarchy beyond jus cogens and the idea of the responsibility of states to act in a protective manner linked with the principle of due diligence and the so-called positive effect that human rights develop.
1 Tzevelekos, V.P., ‘Revisiting the Humanisation of International Law: Limits and Potential - Obligations Erga Omnes, Hierarchy of Rules and the Principle of Due Diligence as the Basis for Further Humanisation’ (2013) 6 Erasmus Law Review 63Google Scholar.
2 Ibid., at 62, where a list with scholarly works on the humanization of international law is given. For a collection of essays on the topic, see M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (2009). The theory of the humanization of international law argues that human rights have an impact on positive international law. For a critical account of the consequences and pitfalls of human rights outside positive international law, see D. Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2004).
3 Lixinski, L., ‘Narratives of the International Legal Order and Why They Matter’ (2013) 6 Erasmus Law Review 2Google Scholar.
4 Tzevelekos, supra note 1, at 63.
5 On the concept of internationalization in general, see L. Delbez, ‘Le Concept d'internationalisation’, (1967) Revue Générale de Droit International Public 5ff. On the internationalization of national constitutions, see Tourard, H., L'Internationalisation des constitutiions nationales (LGDJ, 2000)Google Scholar, especially 371–3, and H. Qazbir, L'Internationalisation du droit constituionnel (2015). See also the old (i.e., before the emergence of human rights as a branch of international law) study by Scelle, G., ‘Le droit constitutionnel international’, in Mélanges Carré de Malberg (1933), 501–15Google Scholar.
6 We acknowledge that the movement between national and international with respect to human rights is not unidirectional, but rather circular. See also infra, notes 12 and 13. While domestic constitutionalism influences international law, international law also influences the drafting of constitutions, particularly newer constitutions. The influence of international law in domestic constitutionalism, by its turn, reinforces the power and authority of international law, and thus its possible constitutionalization. And so on and so forth. For the purposes of this paper, though, we will consider only the influence that domestic constitutionalism has had on the project and language of the constitutionalization of international law.
7 Combacau, J., ‘Le Droit International: Bric-à-Brac ou Système?’ (1986) 31 APD 85Google Scholar.
8 Ibid., 95–101.
9 On the impact of Westphalia on international law, see Hershey, A.S., ‘History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia’ (1912) 6 AJIL 30–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a critical perspective, see Beaulac, S., ‘The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth’ (2004) 9 Australian Journal of Legal History 181Google Scholar.
10 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2012) 214. Although, according to Hart, custom could be seen as a rule of recognition (256, postscript).
11 Peters, A., ‘Are We Moving Towards Constitutionalization of the World Community’ in Cassese, A. (ed.) Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2012) 118–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 119.
12 See, for instance, Waldron, J., ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 19 Har LR 129Google Scholar; Cleveland, SH, ‘Our International Constitution’ (2006) 31 Yale J Intl L 1Google Scholar; Lobel, J, ‘Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extra-Territorial Constitution’ (2011) 36 Yale J Intl L 307Google Scholar, especially 333ff. In that category, one could also add the burgeoning literature on judicial dialogue and legal pluralism. To give just a few examples: Kerr, B.F., ‘The Conversation between Strasbourg and National Courts: Dialogue or Dictation?’ (2009) 44 Irish Jurist 1Google Scholar; G. Martinico and O. Pollicino, The Interaction Between Europe's Legal Systems: Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws (2012); and in the context of legal pluralism, Maduro, M.P., ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of legal and Constitutional Pluralism’ in Dunoff, J.L. and Trachtman, J.P. (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (2009)Google Scholar.
13 In the sense that the internationalization of national constitutions allowed human rights to develop their effects and be developed at the international level, which now have an impact on domestic law and national constitutions. Seen from that perspective, the paper explores the link between modern state-centered constitutionalism, and the current era of post-national constitutionalism.
14 Pellet, A., ‘“Human Rightism” and International Law’ (2000) 10 Italian Yearbook of International Law 3Google Scholar, especially 5.
15 As one of our two anonymous reviewers rightly pointed out, the body of human rights itself is incredibly heterogenous, across difference generations of rights, implementing mechanisms, policies and discourses. It is beyond the scope of this paper to tackle in detail how the constitutionalization discourse affects the multiple strands differently, but, for the present purposes, we would suggest that the constitutionalization narrative seems to favour a strong enforcement mechanism-centered view of human rights. Consequently, our analysis can be seen as favouring civil and political rights, i.e., first generation rights as those are the rights par excellence enforced by (quasi-)adjudicatory human rights mechanisms. Thus, this article should be read as having that view in mind, but also hopefully echoing across other configurations of international human rights law. We are very thankful for the insight.
16 Such as the law on reservations to treaties, which is a question that has been thoroughly discussed over the last two decades. See, for instance, Boerefijn, I., ‘Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations’ in Kamminga, M.T. and Scheinin, M. (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (2009)Google Scholar.
17 For a collection of old but important articles on that topic, see R. Burchill, Democracy and International Law (2006). See also S. Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (2010).
18 The French, New Zealand and Australian Constitutions are notable exceptions, even if the French constitution ultimately incorporates human rights by making reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen from the French Revolution.
19 On Constitutionalism, and its pertinence beyond the State, see Walker, N., ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and especially 525ff.
20 Koskenniemi, M., ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9Google Scholar, especially 18ff.
21 For a collection of essays, M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2007). See especially Fassbender, B., ‘“We the Peoples of the United Nations”: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form in International Law’, in Loughlin, M. and Walker, N. (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (2007) 269Google Scholar.
22 Kumm, M., ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 EJIL 907CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Fassbender, B., ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529Google Scholar.
24 N. Tsagourias (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (2007).
25 Peters, A., ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Cohen, J.L., ‘A Global State of Emergency or the Further Constitutionalization of International Law: A Pluralist Approach’ (2008) 15 Constellations 456CrossRefGoogle Scholar; J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009) 25ff; N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010).
27 Among other publications, see De Wet, E., ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 57ff, and by the same author, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 611.
28 Among other publications by B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community (2009).
29 See also McGinnis, J.O. and Movsesian, M.L., ‘The World Trade Constitution’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 511CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
30 Dunoff, J.L. and Trachtman, J.P., ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in Dunoff, J.L. and Trachtman, J.P. (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 Kammerhofer, J., ‘Constitutionalism and the Myth of Practical Reason: Kelsenian Responses to Methodological Problems’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 723CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also, Van Mullingen, J.G., ‘Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 No scholar has argued (to the best of our knowledge) that this is a full analogy or that a constitution similar to the national ones exists at the global level.
33 Especially with regard to normative hierarchy in international law, see the ‘Introduction’ and the ‘Conclusions’ in E. De Wet and J. Vidmar (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (2012)
34 Krisch, supra note 26.
35 On ‘[g]lobal [c]onstitutionalism as a [h]ermeneutic [d]evice’, see Petters, A., ‘Conclusions’ in Klabbers, J., Peters, A. and Ulfstein, G. (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009)Google Scholar.
36 See Kuo, M.S., who argues that global constitutionalism ‘sits at the crossroads of law and language’, ‘Between Law and Language: When Constitutionalism Goes Plural in a Globalising World’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 872CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 878ff.
37 Klabbers, J., ‘International Legal Positivism and Constitutionalism’ in Kammerhofer, J. and D'Aspremont, J., International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (2014)Google Scholar 268ff.
38 A.M. Saughter, A New World Order (2004) 244ff.
39 Kennedy, D., ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Dunoff, L. and Trachtman, J.P. (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (2009)Google Scholar.
40 See, for instance, Lixinski, L., ‘Choice of Forum in International Human Rights Adjudication and the Unity/Fragmentation Debate: Is Plurality the Way Ahead?’ 18 (2008) Italian Yearbook of International Law 183Google Scholar; Koskenniemi, M., ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197CrossRefGoogle Scholar; or Kennedy, supra note 2.
41 See, e.g., M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World (2008); N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010); or the symposium on ‘Global Public Goods and the Plurality of Legal Orders’ in 21(3) EJIL (2012); J. Klabbers and T. Piiparinen (eds.) Normative pluralism and International Law (2013).
42 See, e.g., J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009); Helfer, L.R., ‘Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System’ (2003) 37 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 193Google Scholar; von Bogdandy, A., ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comments on a Proposal from Germany’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 223Google Scholar; Peters, A., ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal StudiesCrossRefGoogle Scholar; J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (2009); or Walker, N., ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) Political Studies 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
43 Lixinski, supra note 3.
44 See Krisch, supra note 26.
45 Note that there are at least three streams within the constitutionalization project. The first examines constitutionalization of the United Nations (see, e.g., Macdonald, R., ‘The Charter of United Nations in Constitutional Perspective’ (1999) 20 Australian Year Book of International Law 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R.S.J. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (2005); B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community (2009); or J. Crawford, The Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution in H. Fox (ed.), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (1997). The second focuses on the “constitutionalization” of the World Trade Organization (see, e.g., D.Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (2005); or Petersmann, E.U., ‘Constitutionalism and International Organizations’ (1996) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 398)Google Scholar. The third argues that the entire international law is undergoing constitutionalization (see literature cited at supra note 22).
46 One such example is Geir Ulfstein's contributions to J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009).
47 See Tzevelekos, supra note 1, at 63.
48 E.g., J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, supra note 30.
49 See, e.g., Lixinski, L., ‘The Quest for a Founding Norm: Constitutionalization of International Law Revisited – A Review of Nicholas Tsagourias, (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Models’ (2008) 9 Germ LJ 2263Google Scholar.
50 Kumm, M., ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’ in Dunoff, J.L and Trachtman, J.P. (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (2009)Google Scholar.
51 Carty, A., ‘The Yearning for Unity and the Eternal Return of the Tower of Babel’ (2007) 1 EJLS 1Google Scholar.
52 See generally Rajkovic, N., ‘On Fragments and geometry: The International Legal Order as Metaphor and How It Matters’ (2013) 6 Erasmus Law Review 6Google Scholar.
53 Benvenisti, E. and Downs, G.W, ‘The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stan LR 595Google Scholar.
54 Koskenniemi, M., ‘Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional Power’ (2010) 1 Humanity 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
55 Koskenniemi, M., ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (2011).
56 Koskenniemi, M., ‘What is International Law For?’ in Evans, M.D (ed.), International Law (2003)Google Scholar, reprinted in M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (2011).
57 Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, supra note 42, at 350–1.
58 See Lixinski, supra note 40.
59 See Lixinski, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’, (2010) 21(3) EJIL 585–604.
60 See, e.g., Tzevelekos, V.P., ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case-law of the ECtHR: an Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of the Teleology of Human Rights? Between Evolution and Systemic Integration’, (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 621Google Scholar.
61 Tzevelekos, supra note 1, 63.
62 On the latter, see, e.g., M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (2012). But see M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World (2008) 110 (noting that Europe ‘holds no monopoly’ as a ‘laboratory’ for the ordering of a global legal pluralism). See also ibid. at 125–9 (noting the development of the human rights regime in Europe and its impact on the EU trade regime, constituting a ‘school of democracies’). For a critique of legal pluralism in the European Union in the context of human rights and the accession of the European Union to the ECHR, see Lixinski, L., ‘Taming the Fragmentation Monster through Human Rights? International Constitutionalism, 'Pluralism Lite’ and the Common Territory of the two European Legal Orders’ in Kosta, V., Skoutaris, N. and Tzevelekos, V.P (eds.), The EU Accession to the ECHR (2014) 219–33Google Scholar.
63 G. Shaffer, ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World’, (2012) 23(3) EJIL 669, at 671.
64 Burke-White, W.W, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 963Google Scholar, 963.
65 See, e.g., Krisch, supra note 26, 5–6.
66 Burke-White, supra note 64, 964.
67 M. Kumm, supra note 50, 258–324.
68 See, e.g., Tobin, J., ‘Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation’ (2010) 23 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1Google Scholar.
69 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2.
70 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy App no 30544/96 (ECtHR, 7 June 2012) § 197. See also Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey App no 13279/05 (ECtHR, 20 October 2011) § 88; García Ruiz v. Spain App no 30544/96 (ECtHR, 21 January 1999) § 28; Kemmache v. France (No 3) (1994) Series A no 296-C § 44; and, at the Inter-American Court, see IACtHR, Cabreara García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, Judgment of 26 November 2010, §§ 16–22.
71 For a concise account, see D. Shelton, An Introduction to the History of International Human Rights Law (2007) George Washington University Legal Studies Research Paper 326 papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010489## (accessed 16 August 2015). But see also the critical remarks on the origins of human rights by Moyn, S., ‘Plural Cosmopolitanisms and the Origins of Human Rights’, in Douzinas, C. and Gearty, C. (eds.), The Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights (2014), 193–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
72 On self-executing treaties, their doctrinal underpinnings and reception within the US see Vázquez, C.M., ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’, (1995) 89 AJIL 694CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
73 On human rights as erga omnes obligations and their impact on international law, see also, Sicilianos, L.-A., ‘L'influence des droits de l'homme sur la structure du droit international. La hiérarchisation de l'ordre juridique international’, (2012) 116 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 5Google Scholar.
74 Among several others, Franck, T., ‘Individuals and Groups of Individuals as Subjects of International Law’ in Hofmann, R. and Geissler, N. (eds.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law: International Law: From the Traditional State Order Towards the Law of the Global Community, (1999)Google Scholar. See also Spiropoulos, J., ‘L'individu et le Droit International’ (1929) 30 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International 228Google Scholar. Spiropoulos was one of the first to discuss the question, linking the legal personality of the human being with jus gentium. Contra, of course, D. Anzilotti, Cours De Droit International, (1999) (re-edition) LGDJ, 122–3.
75 This is why Verhoeven describes the human being as a ‘passive’ international person that owes its personality to the state. J. Verhoeven, Droit international public (2000) 295ff. On the attributes of that personality and its evolution, see K. Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law (2011).
76 For a collection of studies in these areas, see F. Lenzerini and A.F Vrdoljak (eds.), International Law for Common Goods - Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature (2014).
77 Tzevelekos, supra note 1, 64–6.
78 Among others, de Wet, E., ‘Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes’ in Shelton, D. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013) 541Google Scholar; Byers, M, ‘Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules’ (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 211CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
79 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para. 34.
80 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States (A/56/83), Art. 48(1), especially (b).
81 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States (A/56/83), Art. 54. On countermeasures by non-injured states, see generally, E.K. Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: Countermeasures, the Non-Injured State and the Idea of International Community (2010). See also Bird, A., ‘Third State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations’ (2011) 21 EJIL 896Google Scholar. See mainly, L.A. Sicilianos, ‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community’ in J. Crawford et al. (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (2010) 1137–48.
82 See, e.g., Okowa, P., ‘Issues of Admissibility and the Law on International Responsibility’ in Evans, M.D. (ed.) International Law (2014)Google Scholar 494ff.
83 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Art. 33.
84 See, e.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) [2004] ICJ Rep 12, para. 124. See also the critique by Alston against Petersmann's understanding of trade as a human right. Alston, P., ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’ (2002) 13 EJIL 815CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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86 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 2.
87 If state A breaches the rights of its citizens, state B cannot react by breaching the rights of its own citizens, as this would be both unlawful and meaningless.
88 See ILC Norms on State Responsibility (A/56/83), Arts. 48 and 54. This is linked to what Simma has described as the passage from bilateralism to protection of community interests. Simma, B., ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests’, (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit Iinternationa de La Haye 217Google Scholar. On reciprocity and human rights, see Paulus, A., ‘Whether Universal Values can Prevail over Bilateralism and Reciprocity’ in Cassese, A. (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2011)Google Scholar 91ff.
89 Shelton, D., ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in Evans, M.D. (ed.), International Law (2010) 142–3Google Scholar.
90 Concerning the typology of normative conflicts, see J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (2003) 176. Especially on jus cogens and its “non-conflict” with jurisdictional immunities, see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, para. 92ff.
91 This is taken from the Fitzmauricean classification of obligations, very eloquently presented by Pauwelyn, J., ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 911.
92 United Nations International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission’ (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, para. 408. See also Vidmar, J., ‘Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical International Legal System’ in De Wet, E. and Vidmar, J. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law. The Place of Human Rights (2012) 23–5Google Scholar.
93 Linderfalk, U., ‘International Legal Hierarchy Revisited – The Status of Obligations Erga Omnes’ (2011) 80 Nordic Journal of International Law 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 5ff, and the authors to which Linderfalk refers. See also Simma, B., ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ (2009) 20 EJIL 265CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 272ff.
94 Tzevelekos, supra note 1, at 70.
95 Even an important right, such as the right to life, would not fall in the category of jus cogens as it is not absolute. It may have limitations, for instance in the case of self-defence.
96 C. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) 136ff. And, regarding the links between morality and jus cogens, A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006) 49.
97 Alexy, R., ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’, (2013) 16 Ratio Juris 135Google Scholar.
98 Among several others, Spielmann, D., ‘Obligations positives et effet horizontal des dispositions de la Convention’ in Sudre, F. (ed.), L'interprétation de la Convention Européenne Des Droits de L'homme (1998) 133–74Google Scholar.
99 Eide, A., ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Eide, A., Krause, C. and Rosas, A. (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001) 9Google Scholar. See also O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (2010) 242ff.
100 Mazzeschi, R.P., ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States’ (1992) 35 German Yearbook of International Law 9Google Scholar. T. Koivurova, ‘Due Diligence’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2013).
101 See Tzevelekos, V.P., ‘Reconstructing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights Breaches: Direct Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and Concurrent Responsibility’ (2015) 36 Michigan Journal of International Law 152Google Scholar and the references therein.
102 This implies that positive obligations are obligations of conduct or means. On that class of obligations see A. Tunk, ‘La distinction des obligations de résultat et des obligations de diligence’ (1945) La Semaine Juridique (Juris-Classeur Periodique) 449. See also, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v. Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para. 68 and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para. 430.
103 As opposed to ‘indirect responsibility’. See J. Salmon (ed.), Dictionnaire de Droit International Public (2001) 996. See also the critical comments by Hessbruegge, J.A, ‘The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law’ (2004) 36 NYUJILP 265Google Scholar, at 268–9.
104 Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, at 101.
105 The literature on R2P is vast. Among several others, see S. Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in M.D. Evans (ed.) International Law (2014) 509–33. See also UNGA ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’ (24 October 2015) A/RES/60/1, paras. 138–9.
106 UNGA ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’ (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677. The United Nations Secretary General's 2009 report established the renowned three-pillar structure of R2P.
107 Indeed, to the extent that R2P might amount to a positive international law duty, this will be of means/due diligence.
108 Among others, see Axworthy, L., ‘RtoP and the Evolution of State Sovereignty’ in Genser, J. and Cotler, I. (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Time (2012)Google Scholar and A. Orford, International Authority and Responsibility to Protect (2011) and the sources to which that author refers. See also Dederer, H.G., ‘“Responsibility to Protect” and “Functional Sovereignty”’ in Hilpold, P. (ed.), The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A New Paradigm of International Law (2011)Google Scholar. More generally, see Benvenisti's idea that sovereigns are the trustees of humanity, E. Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: on the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders”, (2013) 107 AJIL, 295–333. For R. Teitel international law is shifting from its sovereignist premises that focus on state security to an order that prioritizes human security. R. Teitel, Humanity's Law (2011).
109 See Tsagourias, N., ‘R2P: An Inquiry into its Transformative Potential’ in Barnes, R.A. and V.P. Tzevelekos (eds.), Beyond Responsibility to Protect: Generating Change in International Law (2016) 435–47Google Scholar.
110 See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, at 22 (recognizing that every state has an ‘obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’).
111 Verdross, A., ‘Forbidden Treaties in International Law. Comments on Professor Garner's Report on “The Law of Treaties”’ (1937) 31 AJIL 571CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
112 See, e.g., UN ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (26 August 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.
113 L. Condorelli and A. Cassese, ‘Is Leviathan Still Holding Sway over International Dealings’ and Alvarez, J. E., ‘Sate Sovereignty is Not Withering Away: A Few Lessons for the Future’ in Cassese, A. (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2012)Google Scholar 14 and 26 respectively.
114 On the origins and meanings of the term in international law, see Kolb, R., ‘Quelques réflexions sur la “communauté internationale”’ (2002) 10 African Yearbook of International Law 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
