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To Link or Not to Link? Agenda Change in International Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2014

Heather Elko Mckibben
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Abstract

Agendas shape the strategies states adopt in international bargaining and, therefore, the substantive nature of the resulting outcomes. They are also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This article analyzes when and why states will use these different ‘issue-linkage’ strategies. Focusing on the effects of a successful agreement and the costs of failure, it highlights conditions under which states are likely to add or subtract issues from the bargaining agenda. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states have adopted in climate-change negotiations. It concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for understanding the outcomes of international negotiations.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 371 - 393
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2014 

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Footnotes

*

Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis (email: hemckibben@ucdavis.edu). The author wishes to thank Brad Jones, Walt Stone, Hugh Ward, the Journal’s editorial team, and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions, and also Madeline Weeks for her research assistance in the data collection process. Data replication sets and online appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10.1017/S0007123414000350.

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