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INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS, RESTRICTED QUANTIFICATION, AND NAIVE TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 October 2015

HARTRY FIELD
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Abstract

This paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 181 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

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References

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