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PERCEPTION, HISTORY AND BENEFIT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2016

Mona Simion
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Abstract

In recent literature, several authors attempt to naturalize epistemic normativity by employing an etiological account of functions. The thought is that epistemic entitlement consists in the normal functioning of our belief-acquisition systems, where the latter acquire the function to reliably deliver true beliefs through a history of biological benefit.

This paper's aim is twofold. First, it puts pressure on the main proper functionalist claim; it is argued that a history of positive biological feedback is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic justification. Second, I suggest that this problem is sourced in a defect of application of functionalist accounts to epistemic normativity, and I offer a fix.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 1: The Epistemology of Perception , March 2016 , pp. 61 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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