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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2015
This paper argues that the Renaissance philosopher Lorenzo Valla's De libero arbitrio (1439) appears to anticipate Luther's De servo arbitrio (1525) on several key issues. This thesis was defended in the 1940s by the well-known Renaissance scholar Charles Trinkaus, who expressed regret over the fact that modern interpreters of Valla's dialogue had “failed to see its connection with the Reformation.” As we shall see further on, however, Trinkaus's position does not seem to have had much impact on the subsequent literature.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2013 annual congress of the Canadian Society for Renaissance Studies, held at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, on June 3, 2013. My thanks to the audience, as well as to Irene Grace Bom, Justin Caouette, and to two anonymous reviewers, for constructive feedback.
1 For Luther's De servo arbitrio I use the Latin text in D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe) (127 vols.; Böhlau, Weimar:, 1883–2009) (hereafter WA) vol. 18, and the English translation in The Bondage of the Will (trans. Packer, James I. and Johnston, Olaf R.; London: Clarke, 1957Google Scholar; repr., Grand Rapids, Mich: Revell, 2006) (page numbers taken from the reprinted edition). For Valla's De libero arbitrio I use the Latin text Laurentii Vallae De libero arbitrio (ed. Maria Anfossi; Opuscoli filosofici: Testi e documenti inediti o rari 6; Florence: Olschki, 1934) (hereafter DLA), and the English translation in “Dialogue on Free Will” (trans. Charles Trinkaus), in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man: Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives (ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul O. Kristeller, and John H. Randall Jr.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) (hereafter DFW) 155–82.
2 Trinkaus, Charles, “The Problem of Free Will in the Renaissance and the Reformation,” JHI 10 (1949) 51–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 60. See also idem, “Introduction,” in Renaissance Philosophy (ed. Cassirer, Kristeller, and Randall), 147–54, at 152–54.
3 DFW, 156; DLA, 46–51 (“Sed adversus alios dicendi multis in locis dabitur tempus; in praesentiarum vero ostendere volumus Boëtium nulla alia causa, nisi quod nimis philosophiae amator fuit, non eo modo quo debuit disputasse de libero arbitrio de consolatione”).
4 DFW, 160; DLA, 153–63 (“Nam quid de aliis dicam? cum Boëtius ipse, cui in explicanda hac quaestione datur ab omnibus palma, quod susceperit implere non possit; sed ad quasdam res confugiat imaginarias et commentitias. Ait enim Deum per intelligentiam, quae supra rationem est, et per aeternitatem omnia scire, omniaque habere praesentia. At ego ad cognitionem intelligentiae et aeternitatis, qui rationalis sum et nihil extra tempus agnosco, aspirare qui possum? Haec ne Boëtium quidem ipsum suspicor intellexisse, si modo vera sunt dixit, quod non credo”).
5 DFW, 161; DLA, 188–90 (“LAU. Quid istuc est quod tibi explicari postulas? AN. Numquid praescientia Dei obstet libertati arbitrii, et an de hac quaestione recte Boëtius disputaverit”).
6 DFW, 162.
7 DFW, 162; DLA, 205–15 (“Si Deus futura providit, aliter non potest evenire quam ille providerit. Veluti si Iudam praevaricatorem vidit fore, impossibile est hunc non praevaricaturum esse, idest necesse est Iudam praevaricari, nisi, quod absit, Deum carere providentia volumus. Hoc cum ita sit, nimirum censendum est genus humanum non habere in sua potestate arbitrii libertatem; nec de malis tantum loquor: nam ut his necessare est make facere, ita bonis e contrario bene, si boni tamen malive dicendi sunt qui arbitrio carent, vel eorum actiones existimandae rectae aut secus, quae necessariae sunt et coactae”).
8 DFW, 162.
9 DFW, 168; DLA, 403–11 (“Longe diversum est aliquid posse fieri et aliquid futurum esse. Possum esse maritus, possum esse miles aut sacerdos, numquid protinus et ero? minime. Ita possum aliter agere quam eventurum sit, tamen non aliter agam: et in manu Iudae erat non peccare, licet foret provisum, sed peccare maluit, quod iam sic fore erat praescitum. Quare rata est praescientia, remanente arbitrii libertate”).
10 DFW, 169.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 170.
14 Ibid., 171.
15 Ibid.
16 DFW, 173; DLA, 558–68 (“Sic se res habet, Sexte. Iupiter, ut lupum rapacem creavit, leporem timidum, leonem animosum, onagrum stolidum, canem rabidum, ovem mitem, ita homini alii finxit dura praecordia, alii mollia, alium ad scelera, alium ad virtutem propensiorem genuit. Praeterea alteri corrigibile, alteri incorrigibile ingenium dedit, tibi vero malignam animam, nec aliqua ope emendabilem tribuit. Itaque et tu pro qualitate ingenii males ages, et Iupiter pro actionum tuarum atque operum modo male mulctabit, et ita fore per Stygiam paludem iuravit”).
17 DFW, 174.
18 Ibid.; DLA, 576–84 (“Hoc est quod pro mea probatione afferre volui, nam haec est vis huius fabulae, ut cum sapientia Dei separari non possit a voluntate illius ac potentia, hac similitudine separarem Apollinis et Iovis: et quod in uno Deo obtineri non valebat, id obtineretur in duobus, utroque suam certam naturam habente, altero quidem creandi ingenia hominum, altero autem sapiendi: ut appareat providentiam non esse causam necessitates, sed hoc, quicquid est, totum ad voluntatem Dei esse referendum”).
19 DFW, 174.
20 Ibid., 176–77.
21 Ibid., 179; DLA, 737–45 (“Audies; hoc enim est quod ego dicere volebam: nam primus Paulus ait: ‘Non est volentis neque currentis hominis, sed miserentis Dei’. Boëtius vero in tota disputatione colligit, non quidem verbis, sed re: Non est providentis Dei, sed volentis ac currentis hominis. Deinde non satis est disputare de providentia Dei, nisi dicatur etiam de voluntate, quod ne multa dicam, ex facto tuo probari potest, qui non contentus prima quaestione explicate, de proxima quoque quaerendum putasti”).
22 DFW, 179.
23 “Libertarian free will” encapsulates the thesis that people have “free will” in a sense that is incompatible with determinism. See, e.g., Berofsky, Bernard, “Preface,” in Free Will and Determinism (ed. idem; New York: Harper & Row, 1966)Google Scholar ix–x: “Men have free will, but only when their behavior is not governed by any deterministic law.”
24 McSorley, Harry J., Luther: Right or Wrong? An Ecumenical-Theological Study of Luther's Major Work, “The Bondage of the Will” (New York: Newman, 1969) 326Google Scholar [italics in original]. For the German original, see Luthers Lehre vom unfreien Willen nach seiner Hauptschrift “De servo arbitrio” im Lichte der biblischen und kirchlichen Tradition (Beiträge zur ökumenischen Theologie 1; Munich: Hueber, 1967) 300 (“ein Werk lobt, in dem die natürliche Freiheit des menschlichen Willens im traditionellen katholischen Sinne verteidigt wird”).
25 Controversies (ed. Charles Trinkaus; trans. Peter Macardle and Clarence H. Miller; vol. 76 of Collected Works of Erasmus; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 16 n. 49.
26 McSorley, Luthers Lehre, 301 (“sagt Valla: ‘. . . nego si possibile est aliter evenire quam praescitum est, consequens esse praescientiam falli posse. . . .’ Für Valla ist beides sicher, Gottes Vorherwissen und der freie Wille des Menschen. Wie beide Größen jedoch vereinbart werden können, so sagt er, kann nicht mit dem Verstand, sondern nur mit dem Glauben erfaßt werden”); McSorley, Luther, 327.
27 McSorley, Luthers Lehre, 301 n. 156; idem, Luther, 327.
28 Cassirer, Ernst, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (trans. Domandi, Mario; New York: Harper & Row, 1964) 80Google Scholar.
29 Ibid., 78 [italics in original].
30 Ibid., 80 [italics added].
31 Cameron, Margaret, “Ac Pene Stoicus: Valla and Leibniz on The Consolation of Philosophy,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2007) 337–54, at 342Google Scholar.
32 Ibid., 341–42.
33 Ibid., 342.
34 See Trinkaus, “Problem of Free Will,” 51–62. See also the footnotes provided by Trinkaus in DFW, 165 (n. 15), 172 (n. 18), and 177 (n. 23).
35 Trinkaus, “Problem of Free Will,” 60.
36 Ibid.; see also his “Introduction,” 153. For Erasmus, see his De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio (ed. Winfried Lesowsky; Darmstadt: Wissenschafte Buchgesellschaft, 1969) 24 (“propemodum videtur cum his sentire”).
37 Trinkaus, “Problem of Free Will,” 60; see also idem, “Introduction,” 153. Luther's words are: “Laurencius Valla ist der best Walh, den ich mein lebtag gesehn oder erfaren hab. De libero arbitrio bene disputant”; see WA-Abteilung 2 (Tischreden) 1:109 (#259).
38 Trinkaus, “Problem of Free Will,” 59.
39 Ibid., 61.
40 Ibid., 61.
41 Ibid., 59 [italics added].
42 WA 1:354 (“Liberum arbitrium post peccatum res est de solo titulo”). The English translation is taken from Career of the Reformer I (ed. Harold J. Grimm; vol. 31 of Luther's Works; Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1957) 48.
43 For the bull, see Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum (33rd ed.; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1965) 1486.
44 WA 7:94–151 (“sed simpliciter debui dicere ‘liberum arbitrium est figmentum in rebus seu titulus sine re,’” “sed omnia . . . de necessitate absoluta eveniunt”). For the English translation, see “Martin Luther's Assertion,” in Controversies (ed. Trinkaus), 301–10.
45 See Erasmus, De libero arbitrio, 24.
46 WA 8:99.
47 See, e.g., Oberman's, HeikoForerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966)Google Scholar and Werden und Wertung der Reformation. Vom Wegestreit zum Glaubenskampf (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977); Pelikan's, JaroslavReformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700) (vol. 4 of The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Lohse's, BernhardLuthers Theologie in ihrer historischen Entwicklung und in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995)Google Scholar; and McGrath's, AlisterIustitia Dei (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.
48 See Rost, Gerhard, Der Prädestinationsgedanke in der Theologie Martin Luthers (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1966)Google Scholar.
49 McSorley, Luther, 326; idem, Luthers Lehre, 300 [italics in original].
50 See Urban, Linwood, “Was Luther a Thoroughgoing Determinist?,” JTS 22 (1971) 113–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
51 See Hägglund, Bengt, “Die Frage der Willensfreiheit in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Erasmus und Luther,” in Renaissance—Reformation. Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten (ed. Buck, August; Arbeitskreis, Wolfenbütteler für Renaissanceforschung 5; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1984) 181–95Google Scholar.
52 Kolb, Robert, Bound Choice, Election, and the Wittenberg Theological Method: From Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Luther Quarterly Books; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005) 12, 294 n. 4Google Scholar.
53 In addition to the absence of discussion of Valla in the above-mentioned English and German studies, there is also a similar absence in Swedish studies of De servo arbitrio. For a summary of twentieth-century Swedish approaches to De servo arbitrio, see Kraal, Anders, “Free Choice, Determinism, and the Re-evaluation of Luther in Twentieth-Century Swedish Theology,” ST 67 (2013) 28–42Google Scholar.
54 See, e.g., Oberman, Werden und Wertung, 64–110; Rost, Prädestinationsgedanke, 89–131; McSorley, Luthers Lehre, 177–84; Hägglund, “Willensfreiheit,” 181–85; McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 188–202; and Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma, 4:138–40. The distinction between “positive” and “negative” influences on Luther's theology can be traced back to Hartmann Grisar's Luther (trans. E. M. Lamond; 6 vols.; London: Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1913–1917) 1:133–64.
55 See, e.g., McSorley, Luthers Lehre, 239; Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma, 4:141; McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 202–3; Urban, “Was Luther a Thoroughgoing Determinist?,” 116–17; and Kolb, Bound Choice, 28–29.
56 De servo arbitrio was written in the fall of 1525, and published in late December of the same year.
57 Trinkaus, “Introduction,” 153. For the Latin, see Erasmus, De libero arbitrio, 24 (“propemodum videtur cum his sentire”).
58 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 107. (Trinkaus's translation is too strong: “one, Wyclife, and another, Lorenzo Valla, . . . is my entire authority”; see Trinkaus, “Problem of Free Will,” 60. The Latin is: “Ex mea vero parte unus Vuicleff et alter Laurentius Valla”; WA 18:640.)
59 For the historical background and early reception of Loci communes, see Manschreck, Clyde L., Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer (New York: Abingdon, 1958) 82–89Google Scholar.
60 WA 18:601; Luther, Bondage of the Will, 62–63 (“de locis Theologicis invictum libellum”).
61 See Melanchthon, Philip, Loci communes theologici, in Melanchthon and Bucer (ed. Pauk, William; LCC 19; London: SCM Press, 1969) 3–152Google Scholar, at 26 [italics added]; and, for the Latin, Loci communes 1521 (ed. Horst Georg Pöhlmann; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993) 34 (“Vallam . . . scholarum sententiam de libero arbitrio confutarit”).
62 It may be of interest to note that David M. Whitford has recently shown that Luther in the spring of 1520 made a careful study of Valla's De Donatione Constantini (which exposed the Donation of Constantine as a forgery) and thereby came to believe that the pope was the antichrist; see Whitford, “The Papal Antichrist: Martin Luther and the Underappreciated Influence of Lorenzo Valla,” Renaissance Quarterly 61 (2008) 26–52. Although this does not shed any direct light on Luther's relation to De libero arbitrio, it is evidence of Luther's high regard for Valla at this stage and of Valla's importance for the radicalization of Luther's thought.
63 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 80; WA 18:615 (“[Deus] omnia incommutabili et aeterna infallibilique voluntate et praevidet et proponit et facit”).
64 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 80–81; WA 18:615 (“omnia quae facimus, omnia quae fiunt, etsi nobis videntur mutabiliter et contingenter fieri, revera tamen fiunt necessario et immutabiliter, si Dei voluntatem spectes”).
65 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 80–81; WA 18:615–16 (“Si volens praescit, aeterna est et immobilis [quia natura] voluntas, si praesciens vult, aeterna est et immobilis [qui natura] scientia. Ex quo sequitur irrefragabiliter, omnia quae facimus, omnia quae fiunt, etsi nobis videntur mutabiliter et contingenter fieri, revera tamen fiunt necessario et immutabiliter, si Dei voluntatem spectes. Voluntas enim Dei efficax est, quae impediri non potest, cum sit naturalis ipsa potentia Dei, Deinde sapiens, ut falli non possit. Non autem impedita voluntate opus ipsum impediri non potest, quin fiat loco, tempore, modo, mensura, quibus ipse et praevidet et vult”).
66 McSorley, Luther, 311; idem, Luthers Lehre, 286.
67 Urban, “Was Luther a Thoroughgoing Determinist?,” 115–16.
68 Kolb, Bound Choice, 26.
69 Ibid., 52.
70 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 80; WA 18:615 (“sternitur et conteritur penitus liberum arbitrium”).
71 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 105; WA 18:637 (“libere possit in utrunque se vertere, neque ea vis ulli caedat vel subiecta sit”).
72 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 102 [italics in original]; WA 18:634 (“Necessario vero dico, non coacte, sed ut illi dicunt, necessitate immutabilitatis, non coactionis, hoc est, homo cum vacat spiritu Dei, non quidem violentia, velut raptus obtorto collo, nolens facit malum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed sponte et libenti voluntate facit”).
73 See, e.g., Watson, Philip S., “The Lutheran Riposte,” in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation (ed. Watson, Philip S. and Gordon, E. Rupp; LCC 17; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969) 12–28, at 25–26Google Scholar. For an account of Watson's subsequent recognition of the inadequacy of this interpretation, see Kraal, “Re-evaluation of Luther,” 36–37.
74 Urban, “Was Luther a Thoroughgoing Determinist?,” 113–14, 126–30.
75 See Erasmus, De libero arbitrio, 24; and Luther, Bondage of the Will, 107; WA 18:640.
76 See Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans (trans. William M. Green; 7 vols.; Loeb Classical Library 412; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) 2:167–87.
77 Ibid., 2:174–75.
78 Ibid., 2:182–83.
79 See, e.g., Rist, John M., “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” JTS 2/20 (1969) 420–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rogers, Katherin A., “Augustine's Compatibilism,” RelS 40 (2004) 415–35Google Scholar; and Helm, Paul, “The Augustinian-Calvinist View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views (ed. Beilby, James K. and Eddy, Paul R.; Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2001) 157–89Google Scholar.
80 For a vivid account of these events, see Bainton, Roland, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: Mentor, 1955) 87–92Google Scholar.
81 See “Articuli Ioannis Wicleff ex CCLX select,” in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (ed. Norman P. Tanner; 2 vols; Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990) 1:422 (art. 56).
82 WA 7:146 (“Quia nulli est in manu sua quippiam cogitare mali aut boni, sed omnia [ut Viglephi articulus constantiae damnatus recte docet] de necessitate absoluta eveniunt”).
83 “Articuli Ioannis Wicleff ex CCLX select,” 1:422 (art. 58) (“Sic Paulus praescitus nonpotest vere poenitere, hoc est contritione peccatum finalis impoenitentiae delere, aut ipsum non habere debere”).
84 According to recent work on Wyclif, Wyclif's dictum that “all things that happen, happen from necessity” is not an endorsement of determinism at all, for the “necessity” here at play is conditioned on the activities of libertarian free will; see Kenny, Anthony, Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 31–41Google Scholar; Lahey, Stephen E., John Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 169–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, for an endorsement of libertarianism on the part of Wyclif, his On Universals (trans. Anthony Kenny; Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) 155–66 (Tractatus de Universalibus XIV). Thus, from the point of view of modern scholarship, Luther was mistaken in associating his denial of free will with Wyclif.
