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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
The study of Origen's anthropology has generated a great deal of interest in the last few decades. This ongoing reassessment has filled considerable lacunae and redressed fundamental misconceptions in this area of his thought. There remains, however, an aspect of his anthropology in need of more thorough analysis. Scholarship on Origen's understanding of sin remains underdeveloped. Most studies of his conception of sin have concerned themselves with his famous teaching on the preexistent fall found in First Principles. Seldom has scholarship traced this theme beyond this early treatise. A notable exception is the ambitious attempt by Georg Teichtweier to offer a comprehensive account of Origen's understanding of sin in his Die Sündenlehre des Origenes. However, the scope of Teichtweier's project is so broad that any sustained expression of any particular aspect of Origen's hamartiological teaching is inhibited.
I would like to thank Lewis Ayres, Matthew R. Crawford, Francis Watson, Dan McCartney, and the anonymous readers at HTR for reading earlier drafts of this article and offering helpful feedback.
1 For recent studies on Origen's anthropology, see Blanc, Cécile, “L'attitude d'Origène a l'égard du corps et de la chair,” StPatr 17 (1982) 843–58Google Scholar; Brown, Peter, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 160–77Google Scholar; Crouzel, Henri, Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956)Google Scholar; idem, Origen (trans. A. S. Worrall; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989) 87–98; idem, “L'anthropologie d'Origène. De l'arché au telos,” in Arché e Telos. L'antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa. Analisi storico-religiosa. Atti del colloquio, Milano, 17–19 maggio 1979 (ed. Ugo Bianchi; Studia patristica Mediolanensia 12; Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1981) 36–57; Jacobsen, Anders-Christian Lund, “Origen on the Human Body,” in Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition; Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 7–31 August 2001 (ed. Lorenzo Perrone in collaboration with Bernardino, P. and Marchini, D.; 2 vols.; BETL 164; Louvain: Louvain University Press, 2003) 1:649–56Google Scholar; de Lubac, Henri, “Tripartite Anthropology,” in Theology in History (trans. Nash, Anne Englund; Francisco, San: Ignatius Press, 1996) 117–49Google Scholar; Dupuis, Jacques, L'Esprit de l'homme. Étude sur l'anthropologie religieuse d'Origène (Museum Lessianum section théologique 62; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1967)Google Scholar; Edwards, Mark J., “Christ or Plato? Origen on Revelation and Anthropology,” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community (ed. Ayres, Lewis and Jones, Gareth; New York: Routledge, 1998) 11–25Google Scholar; idem, Origen against Plato (Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2002) 87–122; idem, “Origen No Gnostic; or, On the Corporeality of Man,” JTS 43 (1992) 23–37; and Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, Origene. Studi di antropologia e di storia della tradizione (Nuovi saggi 90; Rome: Edizioni dell'ateneo, 1984).
2 Teichtweier, Georg, Die Sündenlehre des Origenes (Studien zur Geschichte der katholischen Moraltheologie 7; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1958)Google Scholar. This study is useful in its attempt to offer a wide-ranging and systematic account of Origen's doctrine of sin (e.g., the problem of evil, consequences of sin, punishment for sin, types of sin, forgiveness of sin, etc.). But the broad character of Teichtweier's project, while noteworthy and often valuable, precludes any sustained thesis and offers little sensitivity to particular exegetical concerns on the part of Origen.
3 The study by José Ramón Díaz Sánchez-Cid, Justica, Pecado y Filiación. Sobre el Comentario de Orígenes a los Romanos (Toledo: Estudio Teológico de San Ildefonso, 1991), is concerned primarily with soteriological themes. Sánchez-Cid's analysis of sin is minimal and limited almost exclusively to the sin of Adam.
4 Even though we possess Origen's exegesis of the entire epistle, Rufinus, admittedly, has compressed its length to half the original (Pref. Ruf. 1.1). The reliability of the Latin translation by Rufinus is attested in Chadwick, Henry, “Rufinus and the Tura Papyrus of Origen's Commentary on Romans,” JTS 10 (1959) 10–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 15, and Schelkle, Karl H., Paulus, Lehrer der Väter. Die altkirchliche Auslegung von Römer I–II (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1956) 443–48Google Scholar. For the Greek fragments, see Jean Scherer, Le Commentaire d'Origène sur Rom. III.5–V.7 d'après les extraits du Papyrus n° 88748 du Musée du Caire et les fragments de la Philocalie et du Vaticanus gr. 762. Essai de reconstitution du texte et de la pensée des tomes V et VI du “Commentaire sur l'Épître aux Romains” (Bibliothèque d'Étude 27; Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1957). Scherer notes, “Le traduction de Rufin est souvent précise, exacte et, dans une large mesure, fidèle” (88).
5 The present analysis will be unable to address a significant theme in the Commentary on Romans, namely, volitional sin in relation to Jewish versus Gentile salvation. This corporate dimension of sin plays a large role in Origen's exegesis of Paul and deserves its own study. Nevertheless, Origen often situates this theme within the above context where he sees the soul acquiescing to the flesh in the realm of biblical interpretation. Sin occurs when the law is understood in a fleshly manner rather than a spiritual manner. From there he provides a close reading of Paul that exhibits genuine insight and sensitivity with regard to this important subject, revealing a nuanced and thought-provoking appraisal of Paul's teaching. For more on this, see Origen, Comm. Rom. 3.1; 4.2; 6.12; 7.17; 8.1, 6–9, 11; Cohen, Jeremy, “The Mystery of Israel's Salvation: Romans 11:25–26 in Patristic and Medieval Exegesis,” HTR 98 (2005) 247–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 261–63; Gorday, Peter, Principles of Patristic Exegesis: Romans 9–11 in Origen, John Chrysostom, and Augustine (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1983) 43–102Google Scholar; and Jaubert, Annie, Origène. Homélies sur Josué (SC 71; Paris: Cerf, 1960) 12Google Scholar.
6 Origen, Comm Rom. 1.1 (Hammond Bammel, 16:37; Scheck, 103:53). The English translation is Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1–5; 6–10 (trans. Thomas P. Scheck; FOTC 103–4; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001–2002), unless otherwise noted. All citations are to the critical edition: Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes (ed. Caroline P. Hammond Bammel; 3 vols.; AGBL 16, 33, 34; Freiburg: Herder, 1990–1998).
7 Origen, Comm Rom. 10.3 (Hammond Bammel, 34:791; Scheck, 104:258).
8 Ibid. 2.4, 7; 4.12; 8.10.
9 “May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Thess 5:23; rsv). See also Origen, Comm Rom. 1.12, 21; 7.1; Dial. 136–42; Princ. 3.4.1; Comm. Matt. 13.2; 14.3.
10 Origen, Comm. Rom. 1.12 (Hammond Bammel, 16:69; Scheck, 103:79).
11 Origen, Comm. Rom. 1.12; 7.2; 9.25. See also Wiles, Maurice, The Divine Apostle: The Interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles in the Early Church (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 33Google Scholar.
12 Crouzel, Origen, 88; Dupuis, L'Esprit de l'homme, 66–76. The dynamic quality of this structure is realized often in Origen's appropriation of the “two ways” tradition common in the commentary: “The soul is always midway between the spirit and the flesh and . . . it joins itself either to the flesh, thus becoming one with the flesh, or it associates itself with the spirit and becomes one with the spirit” (Comm. Rom. 1.7 [Hammond Bammel, 16:58; Scheck, 103:71]).
13 Origen, Comm. Rom. 7.1. See also Henri Crouzel, “L'anthropologie d'Origène dans la perspective du combat spirituel,” Revue d'ascétique et de mystique 31 (1955) 1–22, at 10.
14 Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.7 (Hammond Bammel, 16:136–37).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. 7.2.
17 Origen, Comm. Rom. 1.21. See also Crouzel, Origen, 88; idem, “L'anthropologie d'Origène,” 38–39.
18 Origen, Comm. Rom., 1.19; 7.2.
19 Ibid. 3.2. See also Origen, Princ. 3.4.1.
20 Even though the Commentary on Romans contains no explicit references to the preexistent fall, there are at least two enigmatic passages that could be taken in this manner: 5.4 and 7.6. For the preexistent fall in First Principles, see 1.6.2; 1.7.4; 1.8.1; 2.1.1; 2.8.3; 4.4.8.
21 “From this observation [Rom 3:12] it is clear that the original work of the rational nature which was made by God had been upright and was set on the right path as a gift of its Creator,” Origen, Comm. Rom. 3.2 (Hammond Bammel, 16:213; Scheck, 103:195).
22 Crouzel, “L'anthropologie d'Origène,” 36–57; idem, Origen, 87–92; Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, Origène. Traité des Principes (ed. and trans. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti; 5 vols.; SC 252, 253, 268, 269, 312; Paris: Cerf, 1978–1984) 4:87; and Henri de Lubac, “Tripartite Anthropology,” esp. 138–44.
23 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.1 (Hammond Bammel, 33:458). See also 1.7, 21.
24 Ibid. 1.22 (Hammond Bammel, 16:97; Scheck, 103:101). See also Origen, Cels. 6.63.
25 Crouzel laments, “Origen's notion of the body . . . is not easy to pin down and shows many ambiguities” (Origen, 90).
26 Origen, Comm. Rom. 1.1, 19, 21; 4.10, 12; 5.3, 10; 6.1, 3, 4; 7.6, 14; 8.4, 8, 10, 12; 9.2, 3.
27 Ibid. 1.21; 4.1, 7.
28 Ibid. 4.1 (Hammond Bammel, 33:282; Scheck, 103:246). See also Origen, Princ. 1.5.2; Cels. 4.99; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.1.
29 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.8 (Hammond Bammel, 33:502; Scheck, 104:33).
30 Ibid. 9.2 (Hammond Bammel, 34:722; Scheck, 104:200).
31 Older scholarship tended to see Hellenistic influences that often eclipsed Origen's Christian confession (e.g., Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913] and Eugene de Faye, Origen and His Work [trans. Fred Rothwell; London: Allen & Unwin, 1926]). Recent scholarship has tended to see Origen as a man guided by Scripture over against most Hellenistic influences (e.g., Edwards, Origen against Plato; Tzamalikos, P., Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time [Leiden: Brill, 2006]Google Scholar; and idem, Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology [Leiden: Brill, 2007]). The primary focus of this recent scholarship has been to exonerate Origen from the alleged Platonist influence on his thinking. These works have attained a certain degree of success by clarifying misconceptions and properly situating Origen within a Christian context. But their achievements are limited in that their claims are often overstated. See, e.g., the judicious review of Origen against Plato by Maurice Wiles in JTS 55 (2004) 340–44, as well as the telling review of Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time by Mark J. Edwards in JEH 58 (2007) 109–10, at 109, where he notes that the premises put forth by Tzamalikos “distend the evidence.” This relationship is best understood in a manner that does not see Origen as compromising his Christian confession nor steering clear of any philosophical categories altogether. His tempered incorporation of philosophical ideas serves the purpose of attempting to clarify Scripture. But philosophy remains an incomplete discipline in Origen's thinking in that it is insufficient to lead anyone to salvation. Henri Crouzel, for the most part, strikes the appropriate balance with regard to this relationship. He argues that Origen favors some schools over others: Platonism and Stoicism over Aristotelianism and Epicureanism. But no school of thought is without critique and, with the exception of Epicureanism, Origen can find some elements in each school to clarify Scripture. With special attention paid to the Stoics, Crouzel aptly states: “Certes l'intention du Stoïcien, motivée par le sens du bien commun et le respect d'autrui dans la justice, appartient à une moralité authentique. Mais elle ne suffit pas au chrétien dont l'amour de Dieu doit inspirer toute la vie. Le Seigneur doit être le but unique de son activité, l'amour du prochain et tous les autres amours, le sens du bien commun, étant intégrés à l'amour de Dieu” (Origène et la Philosophie [Paris: Aubier, 1962] 101). For more on the Stoic influences on Origen, see below (nn. 38, 40).
32 For a more extended treatment of Origen's homonymic use of “law” in the Commentary on Romans, see Roukema, Reimer, The Diversity of Laws in Origen's Commentary on Romans (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1988)Google Scholar. See also Comm. Rom. 1.1; 3.3.
33 “The Apostle is saying these things about the law which every being, both men and angels, bears naturally within itself by a certain divine dispensation and gift” (Origen, Comm. Rom. 5.1 [Hammond Bammel, 33:380; Scheck, 103:320]). See also Comm. Rom. 3.3.
34 Ibid. 5.1 (Hammond Bammel, 33:376–377; Scheck, 103:317–318, respectively).
35 Ibid. 5.1 (Hammond Bammel, 33:377; Scheck, 103:317). Later in the commentary Origen notes that those too young to apprehend natural law are characterized as being “before the mind within us grows vigorous when it reaches the age of reason” (Comm. Rom. 6.8 [Hammond Bammel, 33:501; Scheck, 104:32]).
36 Ibid. 5.1.
37 “Yet I do not know what time period they could find prior to the giving of the law which was void of sins. When Cain was murdering Abel and defiling the earth with his brother's blood . . . was not sin abounding?” (Origen, Comm. Rom. 5.6 [Hammond Bammel, 33:412; Scheck, 103:345]).
38 In Against Celsus Origen admits to having read Chrysippus (Cels. 1.64; 5.57; 8.51) and Epictetus (Cels. 6.2). The incorporation of Stoic ideas in Origen's exegesis has been demonstrated by Layton, Richard A., “Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions,” VC 54 (2000) 262–82Google Scholar, esp. 265, and Heine, Ronald E., “Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology in Origen's Commentary on the Gospel of John,” JTS 44 (1993) 90–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Origen's relationship to Stoic thought in Against Celsus, see Chadwick, Henry, “Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa,” JTS 48 (1947) 34–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Crouzel summarizes their influence: “As for the Stoics, their morality is accepted, but their cosmology and their theology are regarded as materialist and Origen pokes fun at their cyclical view of time” (Origen, 157).
39 Didymus, Arius, Ecl. 5b3, in Epitome of Stoic Ethics (ed. Pomeroy, Arthur J.; Texts and Translations: Graeco-Roman Series 44/14; Atlanta: SBL, 1999) 17Google Scholar.
40 Ibid. 6 (Pomeroy, 37). See also ibid. 7b; 10a. Tzamalikos admits some Stoic influence on Origen despite his overall aim to refute the Hellenistic charges against him: “Origen definitely moves in a Stoic vein in taking the view that created rationality is always and necessarily embodied in matter. This Stoic tenet was an aspect of their doctrine that matter is permeated and controlled by a rational principle. . . . The cosmos as a whole exhibits a rational structure and governing principle, but obviously some parts of it are distinguished by having a rationality of their own, and are called ‘microcosms’ on this account” (Origen, 116).
41 Epictetus, Disc. 1.26.1–3, in Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments (ed. G. P. Goold; trans. W. A. Oldfather; 2 vols.; LCL 131; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925) 1:167.
42 “Everything that is contrary to right reason is sin. Accordingly, therefore, the philosophers think fit to define the most generic passions thus: lust, as desire disobedient to reason; fear, as weakness disobedient to reason; pleasure, as an elation of the spirit disobedient to reason. If, then, disobedience in reference to reason is the generating cause of sin, how shall we escape the conclusion, that obedience to reason—the Word—which we call faith, will of necessity be the efficacious cause of duty? For virtue itself is a state of the soul rendered harmonious by reason in respect to the whole life. Nay, to crown all, philosophy itself is pronounced to be the cultivation of right reason; so that, necessarily, whatever is done through error of reason is transgression, and is rightly called, (ἁμάρτημα) sin . . . for he who transgresses against reason is no longer rational, but an irrational animal, given up to lusts by which he is ridden (as a horse by his rider). But that which is done right, in obedience to reason, the followers of the Stoics call προσῆκον and καθῆκον, that is, incumbent and fitting” (Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.13, as translated in ANF 2:235).
43 See for example Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.5 (Hammond Bammel, 16:116), where he asserts that the one who dishonors justice and truth dishonors Christ.
44 Origen has already shed some light on this in Princ. 3.1.2–3 and Or. 6.1.
45 Origen, Comm. Rom. 5.6 (Hammond Bammel, 33:414; Scheck, 103:346).
46 P. Aloisius Lieske identifies three functions of the hegemonikon in Origen's thought: 1) the cradle of the intellectual life, 2) the operation of freedom or self-determination of the will, particularly in regard to the religious life, and 3) the communion of the soul with the Logos that establishes religious significance (P. Aloisius Lieske, S.J., Die Theologie der Logos-mystik bei Origenes [Münster: Aschendorff, 1938] 104–5). However, Lieske nowhere develops a relationship between the hegemonikon and sin, nor does he speak of its role in the Commentary on Romans. Stoics understood the soul to be composed of eight parts: five senses (sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell), voice, reproduction, and the hegemonikon. See also Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers (2 vols.; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 1:53HGoogle Scholar; Annas, Julia, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) 61Google Scholar; and Inwood, Brad, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) 29Google Scholar. Inwood, however, clarifies that figures like Chrysippus (and possibly Zeno) can affirm a monistic soul insofar as “the various powers of the soul all function together harmoniously, with no internal conflict or opposition” (ibid., 33).
47 Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 62–63.
48 See Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.7 (Hammond Bammel, 16:136; Scheck, 103:132) and Princ. 1.1.9: “That heart is used for mind, that is, for the intellectual faculty, you will certainly find over and over again in all the scriptures, both the New and the Old” (as translated in On First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the “De princiS0017816014000315s” [trans. G. W. Butterworth; Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973] 14). See also Origen, Comm. Rom. 3.3 and Cels. 6.69.
49 Crouzel, Origen, 88–89. See also Origen, Princ. 2.8.3 for the distinction between “mind” and “soul.”
50 Origen, Comm. Rom. 7.16 (Hammond Bammel, 34:633; Scheck, 104:125) [emphasis mine].
51 Ibid. 6.12.
52 Horsley, Richard A., “The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero,” HTR 71 (1978) 35–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 Crouzel, “L'Anthropologie d'Origène,” 12.
54 Ibid.
55 Origen, Comm. Rom. 9.23 (Hammond Bammel, 34:746; Scheck, 104:220).
56 There are indications in the commentary that Origen sees the hegemonikon as even desiring the good: see ibid. 6.12; 7.6.
57 Ibid. 1.19 (Hammond Bammel, 16:83; Scheck, 103:90). Elsewhere Origen speaks of the law being “ingrafted” (Comm. Rom. 3.3 [Hammond Bammel, 16:225; Scheck, 103:206]).
58 Ibid. 5.1 (Hammond Bammel, 33:376; Scheck, 103:317).
59 Ibid. 3.3 (Hammond Bammel, 16:223; Scheck, 103:203). Roukema notes, “In this Commentary Origen often interprets nomos in the epistle to the Romans with regard to the natural law in order to demonstrate that God is not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also (Rm 3,29). For it is evident that all texts which deal with the natural law pertain also to the Gentiles. His interpretations, which have been criticized since his own time . . . can be understood as an effort to actualize the Pauline principle ‘for the Jew first and also for the Greek’” (Diversity of Laws, 81).
60 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.7 (Hammond Bammel, 33:485; Scheck, 104:21). See also 1.22; 5.10; 6.3.
61 Arius Didymus, Ecl. 10 (Pomeroy, 57). J. M. Rist defines passions as “impulses (
) which have got out of hand, or as irrational movements of the soul” (Stoic Philosophy [Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1969] 39).
62 See Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.13: “‘
,” (For the edition from which this passage is drawn see Les Stromates. Stromate II [ed. Claude Mondésert, S.J.; SC 38; Paris: Cerf, 1954] 82; for a translation into English see ANF 2:361).
63 Sorabji, Richard, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 346–51Google Scholar. Sorabji sees examples of this in Princ. 3.1.4; 3.2.4; Comm. Jo. 15.3; Comm. Matt. 21; and Comm. Cant. 3.
64 Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.5 (Hammond Bammel, 16:128; Scheck, 103:125).
65 Ibid. 3.3 (Hammond Bammel, 16:223; Scheck, 103:204).
66 Ibid. 1.21. Elsewhere in the commentary Origen makes the point that resisting the temptations of the devil is actually evidence of peace (Comm. Rom. 4.8). See also Origen, Princ. 3.2.4.
67 Origen, Comm. Rom. 4.4 (Hammond Bammel, 33:298; Scheck, 103:257). See also 1.21, where he gives an illustration of the soul that receives counsel from virtue and vice, but makes clear that the choice is subsequent to the counsel.
68 Annas clears up the common misconception that “irrational” impulses are devoid of reason. Rather, the distinction is one between good reason versus bad, inadequate reason (Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 106).
69 The exceptions, possibly owing to the Latin translation by Rufinus, are found in Comm. Rom. 3.2; 4.2; 6.1, 9, 14; 7.2, 9, 10, and 13, where “body” and “flesh” are equated. Conversely, “body” can also mean “flesh” (4.6). References to the “flesh” of Christ are entirely positive and ostensibly serve the purpose of warding off a docetic threat.
70 Crouzel, Origen, 92.
71 Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.9 (Hammond Bammel, 16:164; Scheck, 103:155). See also Origen, Princ. 2.10.4.
72 By referring to the hegemonikon as simply “soul” Origen is employing a common Stoic linguistic maneuver. See also Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 29–30.
73 For various assessments of Origen's exploration of the “two souls” doctrine see Alcáin, José Antonio, Cautiverio y Redencíon del Hombre in Origenes (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1973) 113–17Google Scholar; Ferwerda, R., “Two Souls: Origen's and Augustine's Attitude toward the Two Souls Doctrine; Its Place in Greek and Christian Philosophy,” VC 37 (1983) 360–78Google Scholar; and Stroumsa, G. G. and Fredriksen, Paula, “The Two Souls and the Divided Will,” in Self, Soul & Body in Religious Experience (ed. Baumgarten, Albert I.et al.; Leiden: Brill, 1998) 198–217Google Scholar. See also Clement, Strom. 2.20, where he cites Basilides's son Isidorus as an adherent of this doctrine.
74 Sorabji both clarifies and obscures the problem. He acknowledges that church fathers such as Irenaeus, Clement, and Origen speak of and are faced with the heretical teaching of a second soul that is material, has a will of its own, and is directed towards evil. He is also correct to note that Origen rejects this teaching (Emotion and Peace of Mind, 315). However, Sorabji's conclusion is that Origen posits a higher will of our spirit and a lower will of our soul, support for which he curiously finds in the notoriously inconclusive passage in First Principles 3.4.1–5 (Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, 315 n. 66).
75 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.12.
76 Ibid. 7.10 (Hammond Bammel, 34:604; Scheck, 104:101).
77 Ibid. 1.1; 2.4, 7; 4.12; 8.10.
78 Ibid. 6.9.
79 Ibid. (Hammond Bammel, 33:514–15; Scheck, 104:41).
80 Sometimes the two are described as virtually the same and brought together seamlessly (5.6; 6.9) and other times they are basically equated at the outset (6.9; 6.12).
81 [Emphasis mine.] “Quodsi in semet ipsam regressa haec anima pietati rursus et uirtutibus mentis suae ianuam pandat none ingressa pietas impietatem continuo depellet” (Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.1 [Hammond Bammel, 16:100; Scheck, 103:103]).
82 That is, it was added to the “mind”/“intellect” as a result of the preexistent fall. See also Origen, Princ. 2.8.3.
83 Origen, Comm. Rom. 4.9 (Hammond Bammel, 33:343; Scheck, 103:291).
84 Ibid. 4.11 (Hammond Bammel, 33:349; Scheck, 103:295).
85 He speaks of the law of the members as always “suggesting the desires of the flesh” (desideria carnis suggerens), and waiting for decisive action on the part of the soul (ibid. 5.6 [Hammond Bammel, 33:414; Scheck, 103:347]).
86 Ibid. 5.7 (Hammond Bammel, 33:418; Scheck, 103:350).
87 Ibid. 8.10 (Hammond Bammel, 34:692; Scheck, 104:176).
88 Ibid. (Hammond Bammel, 34:693; Scheck, 104:176). See also Matt 12:33: “Either make the tree good and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad; for the tree is known by its fruit” (rsv).
89 Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.1; 7.14.
90 Ibid. 10.5. This lack of faith on the part of the soul is exemplified by its loss of the contemplation of the cross of Christ (ibid. 6.1).
91 Ibid. 2.7; 9.41. See also Origen, Princ. 2.10.4.
92 Origen, Comm. Rom. 2.9 (Hammond Bammel, 16:168; Scheck, 103:158).
93 Ibid. 9.2 (Hammond Bammel, 34:722; Scheck, 104:200).
94 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 2.6.9, in Nicomachean Ethics (trans. H. Rackham; LCL 19; London: William Heinemann, 1926). See also 3.10.1: “Now we have said that Temperance (
) is the observance of the mean (
) in relation to pleasures.” For more on this theme in Aristotle, see 3.11.3; 3.12.9; and 4.4.4. Caroline P. Hammond Bammel has rightly identified this Aristotelian theme in Origen's commentary (Der Römerbrieftext des Rufin und seine Origenes-Übersetzung [AGBL 10; Freiburg: Herder, 1985] 226–27).
95 E.g., Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.9.
96 Ibid. 2.5.
97 Ibid. 5.7 (Hammond Bammel, 33:418; Scheck, 103:350). See also Origen, Princ. 3.2.2.
98 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.14 (Hammond Bammel, 33:539; Scheck, 104:58).
99 Ibid. 9.34 (Hammond Bammel, 34:761; Scheck, 104:233). Here Origen once again uses “flesh” in an equivocal manner denoting both “body” and “flesh.” For more on excess and moderation, see ibid. 1.21; 2.1.
100 Origen, Princ. 3.2.2.
101 Perrone, Lorenzo, “Peccato,” in Origene. Dizionario la cultura, il pensiero, le opere (ed. Castagno, Adele Monaci; Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 2000) 346Google Scholar: “Soggiacendo agli impulsi della carne, l'uomo soddisfa in eccesso i propri bisogni naturali (Prin 3, 2, 2), come più in generale il peccato s'identifica con l'abbandono del ‘giusto mezzo’ virtuoso (CRm 9, 2).” See also Teichtweier, Die Sündenlehre des Origenes, 183–84.
102 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.7 (Hammond Bammel, 33:485; Scheck, 104:21). Cf. 2.5 for an exception to this rule.
103 Ibid. 6.9 (Hammond Bammel, 33:510; Scheck, 104:38); 5.2 (Hammond Bammel, 33:398; Scheck, 103:333), respectively. See also 5.3, 10.
104 Ibid. 6.9.
105 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1.3; 7.10.4.
106 See Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.9–11, where Origen admits that the will struggles to choose the good in the early stages of conversion because it is not in the habit of practicing virtue.
107 Ibid. 5.6.
108 Ibid. 4.9; 5.6, 10.
109 “The clothing of the fallen rational beings in bodies could be an expression of God's mercy towards the fallen beings, because the bodies seem to be necessary for the return of the beings to their former condition” (Jacobsen, “Origen on the Human Body,” 649). Henry Chadwick notes, “Origen begins from the basic fact that the nature of 
is impermanent; it is in a continual state of change and transformation, caused by the food which is eaten, absorbed by the body, and turned into tissue” (“Origen, Celsus, and the Resurrection of the Body,” HTR 41 [1948] 83–102, at 86). See also Origen, Comm. Cant. 6.1, where he refers to our bodies as “in a state of flux and . . . wasting away” (as translated in An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers [trans. Rowan A. Greer; CWS; Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1979] 93).
110 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.4 (Hammond Bammel, 33:471; Scheck, 104:12); 6.9 (Hammond Bammel, 33:515; Scheck, 104:42), respectively. In Comm. Rom. 5.9 Origen draws the distinction between the old man and the new man, the former characterized by members that were enslaved to sin.
111 Ibid. 2.9 (Hammond Bammel, 16:168; Scheck, 103:158). Margeurite Harl observes, “Origène est un optimiste, pour qui la lutte contre les passions est une première étape, vite dépassée, de la progression intérieure” (Origène et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné [Patristica Sorbonensia 2; Paris: Seuil, 1958] 321).
112 Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.14. See also Origen, Princ. 3.2.2, where he says that mere human will is incapable of completing the good act, for it must be brought to perfection by divine help.
113 “While Clement always speaks of apatheia as the essential virtue of the spiritual man, occurrences of apatheia and apathes in Origen's writings can be counted on the fingers of one hand and his teaching is nearer to metriopatheia, the restraint to be imposed on the passions, rather than apatheia itself” (Crouzel, Origen, 7). Johannes Quasten, perhaps laying more emphasis on the ascetic program per se, is not sufficiently judicious in evaluating Origen's material when arguing “the goal is the complete freedom from passions, the 
, the total destruction of 
. In order to reach it, there must be a perpetual mortification of the flesh” (The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus [vol. 2 of Patrology; Utrecht: Spectrum, 1953] 96). See also, e.g., Clement, Strom. 3.7.57; 4.23.152 and Origen, Cels. 1.64. Marcia L. Colish notes Jerome's characterization and vitriolic critique of Pelagian sinlessness being an outcropping of the Stoic idea of apatheia. Colish calls into question both Jerome's understanding of Origen as a proponent of apatheia and the general teachings of the Stoics and Pelagians in this regard (Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century [vol. 2 of The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages; Leiden: Brill, 1985] 77–78). See also Kelly, J. N. D., Jerome: His Life, Writings, and Controversies (New York: Harper & Row, 1975) 315Google Scholar.
114 Origen, Comm. Rom. 9.33 (Hammond Bammel, 34:760–61; Scheck, 104:232). See also Clement, Paed., 1.13.
115 Origen, Comm. Rom. 7.2 (Hammond Bammel, 34:565; Scheck, 104:69). For rationality as integral to the image of God, see ibid. 1.19; 7.2; Princ. 1.8.4.
116 Origen, Comm. Rom. 9.23 (Hammond Bammel, 34:746). In Comm. Rom. 1.20 (Hammond Bammel, 16:86; Scheck, 103:92) Origen says some have “destroyed the image of God within themselves” (ipsis Dei imaginem perdiderunt). For a thorough discussion of this in Origen's theology, see Crouzel, Théologie de l'image, 206–11, and for its influence in subsequent thought, see Elizabeth Clark, A., The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992) 43–84Google Scholar, 101–2. Origen notes that another effect of sin is that it ruins the spiritual senses (Comm. Rom. 4.5). For more on the spiritual senses in Origen's theology see Dillon, John M., “Aisthêsis Noêtê: A Doctrine of Spiritual Senses in Origen and in Plotinus,” in Hellenica et Judaica (ed. Caquot, Andréet al.; Louvain: Peeters, 1986) 443–55Google Scholar; and Rahner, Karl, “The Spiritual Senses in Origen,” in Theological Investigations 16: Experience of the Spirit (trans. Morland, David, O.S.B.; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979), 81–103Google Scholar, esp. 90–91 (originally published in expanded form as “Le début d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origène,” Revue d'ascétique et de mystique 13 [1932] 113–45).
117 Blanc notes, “Il arrive cependant à Origène de manifester à l'égard du corps et de la chair un mépris qui peut être dû à la fois à l'influence des gnostiques et à sa lutte contre eux” (L'attitude d'Origène,” 848) [italics in original]. Blanc, however, provides little evidence for this claim.
118 See Origen, Comm. Rom. 7.2 (Hammond Bammel, 34:566; Scheck, 104:70), where he also laments, “What great futility is contained in these things.” For more on the exegesis of this section, see Lebeau, Paul, “L'interprétation origénienne de Rm 8. 19–22,” in Kyriakon. Festschrift Johannes Quasten (ed. Granfield, Patrick and Jungmann, Josef A.; 2 vols.; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970) 1:336–45Google Scholar. For this same tension in Clement, see Behr, John, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 148CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
119 Origen, Comm. Rom. 4.9 (Hammond Bammel, 33:338; Scheck, 103:287): “Other things, however, are indifferent [indifferentia], that is to say, they are to be designated neither good nor evil, as are wealth, physical beauty, strength, height, and those things which serve the needs of the body.” See also Origen, Comm. Rom. 4.9; 6.6; 10.3; Cels. 4.45; and Teichtweier, Die Sündenlehre des Origenes, 176–85. For more on the Stoic conception of indifferentia, see, e.g., Arius Didymus, Ecl. 5a; 7a; Epictetus, Disc. 1.30.3; 2.9.15; and Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.45; 11.16.
120 Origen, Comm. Rom. 5.3, 9, 10.
121 Ibid. 2.9.
122 E.g., ibid. 1.14; 6.9; 9.42.
123 Brown, The Body and Society, 164. See also Origen, Comm. Rom. 3.2.
124 Origen, Comm. Rom. 7.2 (Hammond Bammel, 34:566; Scheck, 104:70).
125 Ibid. 9.42 (Hammond Bammel, 34:785; Scheck, 104:252).
126 The most relevant studies are Bammel, Caroline P. Hammond, “Augustine, Origen and the Exegesis of St. Paul,” Augustinianum 32 (1992) 341–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; eadem, “Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen,” JEH 47 (1996) 223–35; eadem, “Rufinus’ Translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans and the Pelagian Controversy,” in Storia ed esegesi in Rufino di Concordia (Udine: Arti grafiche friulane, 1992) 131–42; Scheck, Thomas P., Origen and the History of Justification: The Legacy of Origen's Commentary on Romans (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008) 63–103Google Scholar; and Smith, Alfred J., “The Latin Sources of the Commentary of Pelagius on the Epistle of St Paul to the Romans,” JTS 19 (1917–1918) 162–230Google Scholar; 20 (1918–1919) 55–65, 127–77.
