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Monetary Intervention Really Did Mitigate Banking Panics During the Great Depression: Evidence Along the Atlanta Federal Reserve District Border

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2014

Andrew J. Jalil*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Occidental College, 1600 Campus Road, Los Angeles, California 90041. E-mail: jalil@oxy.edu.

Abstract

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Type
Note
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 2014 

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Footnotes

I am indebted to J. Bradford DeLong, Barry Eichengreen, Christina D. Romer, David H. Romer, and James A. Wilcox for their continuous guidance, advice, and support. I am grateful to Matthew Jaremski, Mark R. Miller, Kerry Pannell, Gary Richardson, and Gary Zimmerman for helpful comments and to Lauren Bloomquist, Thomas Verghese, and Joseph Warren for exceptional research assistance. This article benefited from the suggestions of anonymous referees and numerous seminar participants.

References

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