Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Open Peer Commentary

Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in the great apes

Mathias Osvatha1, Tomas Perssona1 and Peter Gärdenforsa1

a1 Department of Philosophy, Lund University, SE-22100 Lund, Sweden. Mathias.Osvath@lucs.lu.se http://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=693&lang=eng Tomas.Persson@lucs.lu.se http://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=692&lang=eng Peter.Gardenfors@lucs.lu.se http://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=691&lang=eng

Abstract

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

Related Articles

    The cognitive bases of human tool use Krist Vaesen Philosophy & Ethics, School of Innovation Sciences, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5612 AZ Eindhoven, The Netherlands. k.vaesen@tue.nl http://home.ieis.tue.nl/kvaesen
    Metrics