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The unbearable lightness of “Thinking”: Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking, rationality, and hypothesis testing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Gary L. Brase
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506. gbrase@ksu.edushanteau@ksu.eduhttp://www.k-state.edu/psych/research/brase_gary.htmhttp://www.k-state.edu/psych/research/shanteau_james.htm
James Shanteau
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506. gbrase@ksu.edushanteau@ksu.eduhttp://www.k-state.edu/psych/research/brase_gary.htmhttp://www.k-state.edu/psych/research/shanteau_james.htm

Abstract

Three correctives can get researchers out of the trap of constructing unitary theories of “thinking”: (1) Strong inference methods largely avoid problems associated with universal prescriptive normativism; (2) theories must recognize that significant modularity of cognitive processes is antithetical to general accounts of thinking; and (3) consideration of the domain-specificity of rationality render many of the present article's issues moot.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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