Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-7qhmt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-28T17:31:16.872Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Michael R. Waldmann
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Göttingen, 37073 Göttingen, Germany. michael.waldmann@bio.uni-goettingen.dehttp://www.psych.uni-goettingen.de/waldmann

Abstract

I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Eskine, K. J., Kacinik, N. A. & Prinz, J. J. (2011) A bad taste in the mouth: Gustatory disgust influences moral judgment. Psychological Science 22:295–99.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and object. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Spohn, W. (2002) The many facets of the theory of rationality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2:247–62.Google Scholar
Waldmann, M. R. & Hagmayer, Y. (in press) Causal reasoning. In: Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology, ed. Reisberg, D.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Waldmann, M. R., Nagel, J. & Wiegmann, A. (in press) Moral judgment. In: The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning, ed. Holyoak, K. J. & Morrison, R. G.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar