The Instability of the Standard Justification for
Physician-Assisted Suicide
THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH a1 a1 Department of Philosophy, University of
San Francisco
Abstract
Proponents commonly justify the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide (PAS) in terms of a patient's wanting to die (autonomy)
and the patient's having a medically established good reason for
suicide. These are the common elements of the standard justification
offered for the legalization of PAS. In what follows, I argue that these
two conditions exist in significant tension with one another, operating
according to distinct dynamics that render the justification for PAS an
unstable “let it be so” basis for public policy. Moreover,
no natural connection keeps these two criteria united. Indeed—as
I argue—the two elements of the justification oppose and threaten
to exclude one another. Thus, the PAS justification is too labile a basis
for sound public policy.
