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In It for the Long Term? Governance and Learning among Chinese Investors in Zambia's Copper Sector*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2009

Abstract

The literature on Chinese economic engagement with Africa reflects widely-held views that Chinese investment is strategic, politically motivated and therefore more stable and long-term than “Western” foreign capital. In contrast this article argues that various factors underpinning the governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in fact serve to promote short-term strategies. It contributes to the literature by empirically exploring this proposition through a case study of a Chinese SOE operating in Zambia's mining sector, and by examining two sets of corporate governance characteristics of Chinese SOEs: investors' relationships with the Chinese state, and firm-level strategy, structure and norms. The article finds that these governance characteristics lead to short-term strategies, including excessive cost-cutting and segregated management practices. These short-term strategies reduce the incentives as well as ability of investors to address local environmental and social concerns, thus questioning the contribution of Chinese investment to Africa's long-term development.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2009

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47 BGRIMM stands for “Beijing General Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy.” See “Dozens killed in Zambia explosion,” BBC News, 21 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4466321.stm.

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54 Finance Minister Magande has acknowledged that growth has been concentrated in urban areas, and in capital-intensive sectors such as mining, trade and construction. “Improved economy hasn't reduced poverty,” The Post, 27 July 2007.

55 An editorial by The Post is spot on when it notes that “foreign investment is not bad. What is bad is the blind belief that foreign investment equals development. That is what we see in most of our leaders. They are sloganeering and parroting this song as an immutable dogma,” 10 June 2007.

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61 As a good example, see the announcement of investment by Zhonghui Mining which mentions a truly wide assortment of political appointees. “Mr Banda said the coming of the new mining company emanates from the visit of President Levy Mwanawasa to the China–Africa Summit and the reciprocal visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao last year,” “New Chinese company coming,” Lusaka Times, 19 March 2008, http://www.lusakatimes.com/?p=2382.

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64 This broker function also works through the Chinese Embassy, such as during the BGRIMM situation which one informant notes quickly became a “government-to-government” issue. Anonymous interviewee 2, NFCA, Kitwe, 25 August 2007.

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73 Among the international mining companies surveyed, only NFCA's annual accounts consistently received auditor qualifications, with Deloitte&Touche citing unavailability of information that makes them “unable to determine whether proper accounting records have been maintained” (NFCA Annual Accounts 2005).

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76 An illustrative example is where the bore-mill broke down at Sino-Metals, and the company – not having stocked the necessary spares – was forced to airlift equipment from China. Interview with Edward Mwamulima, Kitwe, 30 October 2007.

77 Following this intervention, unanticipated by ECZ officials, KCM was merely instructed to implement mitigating measures (e.g. replacing the pipeline, stocking greater quantities of lime) to avoid future incidents. Interviews with various ECZ officials, Lusaka and Ndola, August–November 2007.

78 Lameck Malema, Director, Loma Ltd., Kitwe, 11 October 2007.

79 Anonymous interviewee 2, NFCA, Kitwe, 25 August 2007.

80 In 2006 production at NFCA was stopped for eight days upon the insistence of the Mines Safety Department because the rope winder for one of the shaft elevators needed its brakes replaced. Production was eventually resumed, without replacing the lift's brakes. “I asked somebody, why is it that this winder is running, when we were told it has a problem. He said ‘this man who came, we took him to see the CEO, and that is how we produced a certificate saying that the winder is OK’ … When an official proves to be difficult, they take him to the higher management, so he is given something there.” Anonymous interviewee 1, NFCA, Kitwe, 2 December 2007.

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82 According to data from Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (from 2007), NFCA pays the lowest average wage (Kwacha 310.000 per month) among the large foreign-owned mining companies.

83 Anonymous interviewee 2, NFCA, Kitwe, 25 August 2007.

84 Interviews with Sophie Masupha, vice-president, human resources, KCM, Chingola, 12 November 2007; and Anne-Marie Mwenya, company secretary, Chambishi Metals, Chambishi, 4 October 2007.

85 Interview with Andrew Hickman, company secretary, First Quantum Bwana Mkubwa, Ndola, 2 December 2007.

86 Interview with Joel Chitambala, business controller, marketing and treasury, KCM, Chingola, 17 September 2007.

87 Anonymous interviewee 2, NFCA, Kitwe, 25 August 2007.

88 Interview with Gao Xiang, NFCA, Chambishi.

89 Various interviews with relevant officials in Lusaka, Ndola and Kitwe, Zambia.

90 Interview with Charles Muchimba, director of information and research, MUZ.

91 At the time of the study, NFCA nevertheless remained the only foreign mining company not to provide medical coverage for all dependents of an employee. Anonymous interviewee 1, NFCA.

92 Ibid.

93 North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; DiMaggio, Paul J. and Powell, Walter W. (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

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97 Ibid.

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