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Congress in the World: Benefits of the Congressional Fellowship Program for the Study of International Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 August 2008

Kathryn C. Lavelle
Affiliation:
Case Western Reserve University. E-mail: kathryn.lavelle@case.edu

Abstract

The Congressional Fellowship Program of the American Political Science Association charted new territory in the 1950s when it opened the internal workings of Congress to subsequent generations of political science scholars. Numerous programs incorporating a “Hill” experience into a variety of academic disciplines have imitated it since then. However, scholarship in the subfield of international relations has not benefited from the opportunities the program offers to the same extent as other disciplines and subfields have. I use a sample of legislative and policy matters that I encountered as a fellow in the 2006–2007 year to argue that a wide spectrum of theoretical work in international political economy would profit from insights generated by the type of direct participation the program affords. Specifically, I connect literature across subfields on institutional change, and relate how my experiences with Darfur divestment legislation, Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) legislation, and politics in a financial crisis hold the potential to enrich our understanding of the international political economy. I suggest where more direct experience with other issues by other scholars could prompt additional insights for research on U.S. foreign policy and international relations.

Type
Perspectives
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2008

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