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More me? Substance concepts and self concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Carol Slater
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Alma College, Alma, MI 48801 cslater@alma.edu

Abstract

User intentions invoked to account for the distinctive way in which public-language natural-kind terms gather their extensions are inapplicable in the case of Millikan's substance concepts. I suggest that theoretical justification is preferable and available and raise exploratory questions about the applicability of the notion of substance concepts to the genesis of self concepts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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