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The illusory triumph of machine over mind: Wegner's eliminativism and the real promise of psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Anthony I. Jack  and
Philip Robbins
Anthony I. Jack*
Affiliation:
Department of Neurology, Washington University in St. Louis School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO63110http://www.nil.wustl.edu/labs/corbetta/personnel/ajack.html
Philip Robbins*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Philosophy–Neuroscience–Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO63130-4899http://artsci.wustl.edu/~probbins/home
*
ajack@npg.wustl.edu
probbins@artsci.wustl.edu
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Abstract:

Wegner's thesis that the experience of will is an illusion is not just wrong, it is an impediment to progress in psychology. We discuss two readings of Wegner's thesis and find that neither can motivate his larger conclusion. Wegner thinks science requires us to dismiss our experiences. Its real promise is to help us to make better sense of them.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 5 , October 2004 , pp. 665 - 666
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Notes

1. To be fair to Wegner, this theoretical distinction has only recently come to the fore (Jack & Shallice 2001; Lambie & Marcel 2002; Schooler 2002).

2. Wegner explains automatisms via his theory of ironic processes. The idea is that the conscious intention not to perform a certain action actually has the effect of giving rise to the action that the subject is trying to inhibit. Wegner has produced substantial evidence that inhibitory mental sets have such ironic effects in other contexts (notably thought suppression). Although the conscious intention causes the action, the subject does not experience the action as willed because the action is inconsistent with the aim of the intention.

3. Wegner (2003a) cites Jack and Shallice (2001) as providing such a framework.

4. The belief is so abstract that it is hard to imagine what it would be like to have it. Direct access implies certain knowledge, so the illusion would cause the subject to believe that their experience of agency cannot be mistaken. If you can doubt your experience of agency, then you cannot be suffering from an illusion of causal transparency.

5. The argument that Wegner implicitly relies on to reach his profoundly skeptical view of the mind closely echoes the argument Descartes uses to derive his skepticism about the external world. In both arguments the demonstration that we can be mistaken on occasion is used to motivate the much more radical view that we should question everything. The difference is that for Descartes, the mind was certain and the external world was thrown into doubt, whereas for Wegner, mechanistic explanation is solid while the mind is thrown into doubt.