Thanks to Vinod Aggarwal, Tom Bickford, Bob Bullock, Barbara Connolly, Stephan Haggard, Jeff Keele, Carol Medlin, Greg Noble, John Odell, Richard Snyder, and the anonymous referees of International Organization for their comments.

1. For two other reviews, see Wade, Robert, “East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Paradigms, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence,” World Politics 44 (1992), pp. 270–320CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Onis, Ziya, “The Logic of the Developmental State,” Comparative Politics 24 (10 1991), pp. 109–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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3. For an excellent overview of eight Asian economies that generally stresses neoclassical explanations but is sensitive to government intervention, see World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

4. See, for example, Hong, Wontack, Factor Supply and Factor Intensity of Trade in Korea (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1976)Google Scholar; Lee, Gye-Sik, “Bokjigukgaui Jongewa Bokji Jaewon Jodal Jongcheck” (The development and financial policies of the public welfare state), working paper no. 91–25, Korea Development Institute, Seoul, 08 1991Google Scholar; Jong, Byong-Gol and Yang, Yung-Sik, Hanguk Chaebol Bumunui Gyongje Bunsok (An analysis of the economics of the Korean chaebol), (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1992)Google Scholar; and Kim, Yoon Hyung, Hankuk Cheolgang gongeop ui seongjang (Growth of iron and steel industries in Korea) (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1989)Google Scholar.

5. Amsden, Alice, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 8, emphasis originalGoogle Scholar.

6. Ibid., p. 12.

7. Ibid., p. 243.

8. The quotation is from ibid., p. 14.

9. Wade, Robert, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), p. 73Google Scholar.

10. Ibid., pp. 301–2.

11. For example, work on strategic trade moves past standard neoclassical prescriptions for fully free markets and incorporates notions of increasing returns to scale and first-mover advantages. See Grossman, Gene M. and Richardson, J. David, “Strategic Trade Policy: A Survey of Issues and Early Analysis,” Special Papers in International Economics, no. 15, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1985Google Scholar; and Krugman, Paul, Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986)Google Scholar. On development in particular, see Lau, Lawrence and Kim, Jong-il, “The Role of Human Capital in the Economic Growth of the East Asian NICs,” (Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., 1993, mimeographed)Google Scholar; Young, Alwyn, “A Tale of Two Cities: Factor Accumulation and Technical Change in Hong Kong and Singapore,” in National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Leff, Nathaniel H. and Sato, Kazuo, “Psychocultural Conditions and Economic Development: Saving and Investment Behavior in East Asia and Latin America,” working paper no. FB-88–32, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, 1988Google Scholar; and Bradford, Colin I. Jr, and Branson, William H., eds., Trade and Structural Change in Pacific Asia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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13. Ironically, Amsden cites Kukje as an example of economic considerations driving government support or sanctions. See ibid.

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15. Gereffi, Gary, “Paths of Industrialization: An Overview,” in Gereffi, and Wyman, , Manufacturing Miracles, p. 12Google Scholar. Peter Chow finds that export growth significantly influenced industrial development in Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and the East Asian NICs. Only in Argentina was no causality apparent. See Chow, Peter C. Y., “Causality Between Export Growth and Industrial Development: Empirical Evidence from the NICs,” Journal of Development Economics 26 (06 1987), pp. 55–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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17. Jeffry Frieden, personal communication, 11 October 1993. Even the World Bank cautiously is beginning to admit that some government intervention can be positive. In a recent study, funded in part with Japanese funds, the World Bank concludes that “In some economies, mainly those in Northeast Asia, some selective interventions contributed to growth.” See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, p. viGoogle Scholar.

18. Kaufman, Robert, “How Societies Change Developmental Models or Keep Them: Reflections on the Latin American Experience in the 1930s and the Postwar World,” in Gereffi, and Wyman, , Manufacturing Miracles, pp. 110–38Google Scholar. The quotation is drawn from p. 127.

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36. According to Wade, “[in Taiwan] the share of manufacturing value-added held by firms with five-hundred employees or more was unusually high by world standards. Firms of that size accounted for 57.9 percent of manufacturing value-added, compared to 52.7 percent in Korea, 48.7 percent in the U.S. and under 40 percent in J a p a n.… In Taiwan, from 1972 to 1979 the share of the top one hundred private manufacturing firms in total manufacturing assets increased from 30 percent to 44 percent.” See Wade, , Governing the Market, p. 68, emphasis originalGoogle Scholar. See also Nugent, Jeffrey B. and Nabli, Mustapha K., “An Institutional Analysis of the Size Distribution of Manufacturing Establishments: An International Cross-Section Study,” working paper no. 8921, Korea Development Institute, Seoul, 08 1989Google Scholar. For a cross-national comparison of public utilities, see Levy, Brian and Spiller, Pablo, “Regulation, Institutions, and Commitment in Telecommunications: A Comparative Analysis of Five Country Studies,” manuscript, University of Illinois, 1993Google Scholar.

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41. Equity provides for more internal control within a firm and thus decreases the potential for opportunism. Debt, on the other hand, can increase the capitalization of a firm, but also increases contractual and financial hazards. For a treatment of finance in the NIE, see Williamson, Oliver E., “Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance,” Journal of Finance 43 (07 1988), pp. 567–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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50. Writing in 1968, Henderson noted that “The bureaucracy tends to be little hampered by legislative surveillance. Corruption, having fewer checks, again flourished.” See Henderson, Gregory, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 190Google Scholar. For detailed studies of the Korean bureaucracy that tend to emphasize the corrupt aspects, see Kim, Young Jong, Bureaucratic Corruption: The Case of Korea (Seoul: The Chomyung Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Kim, Bun Woong and Bell, David S. Jr, eds., Administrative Dynamics and Development: The Korean Experience (Seoul: Kyobo Publishers, 1985)Google Scholar. See also Lee, Hahn-been, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1968)Google Scholar; and Whang, In Joung, “Government Direction of the Korean Economy,” in Caiden, Gerald E. and Kim, Bun Woong, eds., A Dragon's Progress: Development Administration in Korea (Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1991), pp. 107–122Google Scholar. For the conventional wisdom emphasizing an efficient bureaucracy, see Rhee, Yung-whan, Ross-Larson, Bruce, and Pursell, Gary, Korea's Competitive Edge: Managing the Entry into World Markets (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

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52. In an intriguing study of machine politics in Chicago, Erie notes that the Irish machine reformed certain sectors of the bureaucracy with an eye toward efficiency. Such reform allowed the machine to capture the resulting efficiency gains for itself. See Erie, Steve, Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)Google Scholar. See also Silberman, Bernard, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

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55. See Moon, Chung-in, “The Demise of the Developmentalist State? Neoconservative Reforms and Political Consequences in South Korea,” Journal of Developing Societies 4 (01 1988), pp. 67–84Google Scholar; and Kim, Eun-mee, “Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case,” Social Problems 40 (05 1993), pp. 223–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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64. Ibid., p. 192.

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84. China and Taiwan have engaged in sporadic engagements since the KMT's takeover of Taiwan. For some accounts of these engagements and Taiwan's and Korea's defense policies in general, see Gregor, A. James and Chang, Maria Hsia, The Iron Triangle: A U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Press, 1984), especially p. 83Google Scholar.

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87. Hagen Koo writes, “As bastions of the anticommunist struggle, South Korea and Taiwan both received enormous amounts of US aid and military assistance.” See Koo, , “The Interplay of State, Social Class, and World System in East Asian Development,” p. 167Google Scholar.

88. Ibid., p. 168. For other accounts of this pressure on Taiwan, see Zenger, J. P., “Taiwan: Behind the Economic Miracle,” AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 9 (01 1977), pp. 79–91Google Scholar; and Little, Ian D., “An Economic Renaissance,” in Galenson, Walter, ed., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 448–508Google Scholar.

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