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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
Gibraltar provides an instrumental lesson in the study of international affairs. In some areas, and on some subjects, reasoned rational compromises and solutions to disputes and differences between peoples and sovereign states are rendered impossible because of the emotional arguments which are introduced and which lead to entrenched, immutable negotiating positions. No issue is more likely to generate these situations than disputes over areas of land and differences over sovereignty. History supports this conclusion; territorial disputes concerning rights to entitlement have proved the most common cause of disagreement leading, first, to acrimonious relationships, then to the breakdown of communication and, finally, to overt physical hostilities and war.
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21. A good illustration of the charged, emotional nature of the dispute is the refusal of the King of Spain to attend the wedding of the Prince of Wales to Lady Diana Spencer when it was learnt that they intended to join the Royal Yacht, Britannia, at Gibraltar at the start of their honeymoon, August 1st 1981. Needless to say, the Gibraltarians were highly delighted, seeing the decision as a symbolic gesture of Britain's commitment.
