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Public Finance, Special Interests, and Direct Wine Shipping Laws in the United States*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2012

Omer Gokcekus  and
Dennis Nottebaum
Omer Gokcekus*
Affiliation:
Omer Gokcekus: John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, USA, omer.gokcekus@shu.edu
Dennis Nottebaum
Affiliation:
Dennis Nottebaum: Centre for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW), University of Münster, Germany, nottebaum@wwu.de
*
For all correspondence: Omer Gokcekus, John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA; tel.: 973-313-6272, fax: 973-275-2519, e-mail: omer.gokcekus@shu.edu
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Abstract

This study develops thirteen criteria to detail diverging direct shipping laws of the U.S. states. It also investigates why some states have prohibitive laws by utilizing a logit regression model. Regression results provide strong support for public finance and special interest arguments: It appears that states concerned about incurring losses in tax revenues, that is, that are heavily dependent on federal aid and have low state revenues, and protecting the wholesalers and retailers that benefit from the three-tier system (at the expense of wineries and wine drinkers) are most likely to have a prohibitive law. (JEL Classification: D72, H71, Q18)

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Wine Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , May 2012 , pp. 35 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2012

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Footnotes

*

The authors thank Andrew Fargnoli, Adam Godet, Justin Myzie, Ryan Kane, Nicolas Reinhart, Edward Tower, and Daniel Verderosa, participants in the 2008 American Association of Wine Economists Meeting in Portland, two anonymous referees, and Karl Storchmann for their comments and suggestions.

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