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‘More than the Sum of Parts': Social Policy and Expressive Collective Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2008

Philip Jones
Philip Jones*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath, Bath E-mail P.R.Jones@bath.ac.uk
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Abstract

Response to social policy often differs systematically from predictions premised on instrumental motivation. Individuals respond even when they believe that action by one person will make very little difference. But if each individual is motivated by the intrinsic value of action, collectively individuals will make a difference. If policy informs perceptions of the intrinsic value of action should policy be designed to increase willingness to act as a ‘knight’ or ‘good citizen’?

Type
Articles
Information
Social Policy and Society , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , January 2008 , pp. 27 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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