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Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2012

Eoin O'Connell
Eoin O'Connell*
Affiliation:
Manhattan College
*
Email: eoin.oconnell@manhattan.edu
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Abstract

This paper considers two contenders for the title of highest good in Kant's theory of practical reason: happiness proportioned to virtue and the maximization of happiness and virtue. I defend the ‘proportionality thesis’ against criticisms made by Andrews Reath and others, and show how it resolves a dualism between prudential and moral practical reasoning. By distinguishing between the highest good as a principle of evaluation and an object of agency, I conclude that the maximization of happiness and virtue is a corollary of the instantiation of the proportionality thesis.

Keywords

Kanthighest goodproportionality thesisAndrews Reath
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , 08 June 2012 , pp. 257 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2012

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