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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
One can feel guilty without thinking that one actually is guilty of moral wrongdoing. For example, one can feel guilty about eating an ice cream or skipping aerobics, even if one doesn't take a moralistic view of self-indulgence. And one can feel guilty about things that aren't one's doing at all, as in the case of survivor's guilt about being spared some catastrophe suffered by others. Guilt without perceived wrongdoing may of course be irrational, but I think it is sometimes rational, and I want to explore how it can be.
1 I argue for this claim at length in ‘A Rational Super-Ego’, Philosophical Review 108, 529–58 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Civilization and its Discontents, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Strachey, James et al. (eds), (London: the Hogarth Press), vol. 21, 59–145, p. 124Google Scholar. See also Outline of Psychoanalysis, S. E. 23: 205.
3 See my ‘Love as a Moral Emotion,’ Ethics 109, 338–74 (1999).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 The prisoners' dilemma gets its name from the following philosophical fiction. Two prisoners are questioned separately, under suspicion of having committed a crime together. Each is offered the following plea bargain: if he gives testimony against the other, his sentence (whateven it otherwise would have been) will be reduced by one year; if he is convicted on the other's testimony, his sentence will be increased by two years. Each person will benefit from giving testimony against the other, no matter what the other does; but if both avail themselves of this benefit, each will be harmed by other's testimony, and the harm will be greater than the benefit of testifying.
The discussion in the text refers to ‘iterated’ prisoners' dilemmas— that is, a series of decision problems of the same form, as would confront a pair of hapless recidivists who were repeatedly caught and offered the same bargain. This series of decision problems is often described as a game, in which the prisoners are “players” who make successive “moves.” In the context of this discussion, ‘co-operating’ is defined in relation to the other prisoner, rather than the authorities—that is, as withholding one's testimony.
5 See my ‘How to Share an Intention,’ in The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 200–220Google Scholar. My conception of shared intention is based on the theory of Margaret Gilbert (see Gilbert's, On Social Facts [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992]).Google Scholar
6 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Paton, H. J. (New York: Harper, 1964), 91Google Scholar (p. 424 in the Royal Prussian Academy edition).
7 See Bratman's, MichaelIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).Google Scholar
