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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2010
Kant's ethics is widely viewed as inimical to environmental values, as arbitrary and morally impoverished, because, while exalting the value of human, rational, beings, it denies moral consideration to non-human, or non-rational, beings. In this paper I seek to show how, when specific statements of this general view are examined, they turn out to involve some significant inaccuracies or confusions. This will lead me to suggest that Kant might have more to offer to environmental ethics than has hitherto been acknowledged.
1 This has been questioned by Broadie and Pybus (1974, p. 376) who claim ‘there is no contradiction involved either in the universalisation, or in the willing of the universalisation, of the maxim that I will always treat animals as if they have no capacity for suffering’. There is a contradiction, though, in saying ‘I will always treat beings with a capacity for suffering as if they have no capacity for suffering’.
2 ‘A right is something a man can stand on, something that can be demanded or insisted upon without embarrassment or shame…. No amount of love and compassion … can substitute for those values’ (Feinberg, 1973, pp. 58–59). Given that it may not always be possible to separate the metaphor of ‘standing’ from the (masculine) values of the courtroom, it might be better to restrict its use so as to leave other spaces for other values.
3 See also the contributions of Elliot and Midgley in this volume.
4 Thanks especially to Robin Attfield, Angelika Krebs and John O'Neill for their helpful and probing responses to an earlier version of this paper.
