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Measurement and sources of technical efficiency of land tenure contracts in Ethiopia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2002

Mohamed M. Ahmed
Affiliation:
LPAP, ILRI, P.O. Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Tel: 251–1–61 32 15. Fax: 251–1–61 18 92. Email: m.m.ahmed@cgiar.org
Berhanu Gebremedhin
Affiliation:
Livestock Policy Analysis Program (LPAP), International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).
Samuel Benin
Affiliation:
Livestock Policy Analysis Program (LPAP), International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).
Simeon Ehui
Affiliation:
Livestock Policy Analysis Program (LPAP), International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).

Abstract

The degree to which prevailing land tenure arrangements constrain agricultural productivity, and the sources of inefficiency associated with land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa are unresolved. Using a stochastic frontier production function, this paper examines the economic efficiency and the determinants of inefficiency of alternative land tenure arrangements in Ethiopia. The results show that sharecropping and borrowing are less technically efficient than owner-cultivation or fixed rentals due to restrictions imposed on them by landowners and the interactions of the land market with other imperfect and absent input markets. Thus, a policy to facilitate more efficient transactions of land between farmers and functioning of input markets are expected to reduce inefficiencies associated with these tenure systems.

Type
Theory and Applications
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

The authors would like to acknowledge the effort of Dr. Sarah Gavian in collecting and documenting the data used in this analysis. We are also grateful for the two anonymous reviewers of this journal and to Dr. Garth Holloway for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Partial funding for this research was provided by the World Bank.