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Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

H. W. Arthurs
Affiliation:
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University

Abstract

Globalization is not simply a matter of transnational trade, and of the state, non-state and supra-state legal regimes which facilitate, regulate or resist it; it also involves transnational social, cultural, intellectual and ideological forces. These forces play upon strategically located knowledge-based elites which play an important role in restructuring the legal fields by which public and public and private institutions are constituted. Canada's experience of globalization—unique because of proximity to the United States—has been both exemplified and, in part, shaped by the fate of its knowledge-based elites, including the business community (especially that part of it involved directly or indirectly with transnational corporations), academics and intellectuals, lawyers, artists and other cultural figures, and individuals involved in politics and public administration. Because of the effects of this “globalization of the mind” upon the institutions which all of these elites inhabit, state and non-state legal fields associated with them have been transformed.

Résumé

La globalisation ne touche pas que les échanges commerciaux transnationaux ou les régimes juridiques étatiques, non étatiques et supra étatiques visant à encourager, à réglementer ou empêcher ces échanges; la globalisation envisage les mouvements transnationaux d'échanges culturels, sociaux, intellectuels et idéologiques. Ces mouvements exercent une influence, bien subconsciente, sur les élites pensantes et influentes ayant une voix importante dans la restructuration du droit qui à son tour modèle l'opinion publique et les institutions étatiques et privées. L'expérience canadienne de la globalisation—unique en son genre en raison de la proximité des États-Unis—a aussi bien servi d'exemple qu'elle calque, en partie, son destin sur celui de l'élite pensante, y compris celle du monde des affaires (particulièrement les membres de cette élite qui oeuvrent directement ou indirectement auprès des sociétés transnationales) et du monde universitaire et intellectuel, les juristes, les artistes et autres personnages du monde culturel, ainsi que les membres de la branche politique et de l'administration publique. En raison de ce phénomène de «globalisation de la pensée» observé au sein des institutions occupées par ces élites, les professions juridiques étatiques et non étatiques liées de près ou de loin à ces institutions ont subi une transformation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 1997

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55. I do not mean to ignore the teachings of Harold Innis, which are particularly salient in any discussion of the linkages between the domestic and world economies, and between the economy and culture. See Drache, D., ed., Staples, Markets and Cultural Change: Selected Essays by Harold A. Innis (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. However, Innis' views are hardly dominant amongst Canadian academic economists today.

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58. See e.g. Huwitt, P., “Twenty-Five Years of Canadian Economics” (1993) 26:1Canadian Journal of Economics 1Google Scholar. P. Fortin, “Where We Were. Where We Are: The First Eight CEA Meetings and the Last Four,” ibid. at 55, reports a discernible decline in published articles with some Canadian content (46% to 33%) and an increase towards articles which are purely theoretical. As non-academics are more likely to publish articles with Canadian empirical or policy content, amongst academic economists, the decline is even greater.

59. My preliminary analysis of teaching and scholarship in administrative and constitutional law shows that professors with graduate degrees from U.S. institutions constitute an absolute majority (about 53%) of those teaching in the field in common law schools, and an even larger proportion (about 64%) of those who have published English language books on either subject. As an interesting sidelight, there is a clear divergence between civil and common law scholars in these politically sensitive fields. U.S. graduate degrees are relatively rare in civil law schools; Canadian and French graduate degrees are equal in number (about 34%); and Canadian-trained authors contribute a disproportionate share of publications (about 43%). Conceivably, this is one source of the divergence in attitudes within legal academe towards the state, federalism, individual and collective rights etc. as between Quebec and the rest of Canada. This hypothesis gains strength to the extent that common law professors with Canadian graduate degrees training were in many cases taught by professors of an earlier generation who were themselves mostly American-trained..

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75. And within Canada, Quebec is an even more special case.

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78. Disagreement over protection for domestic cultural industries was one of the most difficult issues to resolve during both the NAFTA negotiations and the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. See e.g. Davies, R., “Signing Away Canada's Soul: Culture, Identity and the Free Trade Agreement” (1989) 278 Harper's Magazine 43Google Scholar; Fuller, C., “Fade to Black: Culture Under Free Trade” (August 1991) Canadian Forum 5Google Scholar; McDonald, M., “A Futile Struggle to Withstand U.S. Culture” Toronto Star (9 October 1993) C4–C6Google Scholar; Rever, J., “France Faces off with Rambo” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 February 1995) C9Google Scholar; Fagan, D., “Will that be Culture—or Cash?” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 January 1996) B1–B2Google Scholar; Fagan, D., “U.S. Takes Canada to Trade Court “[Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 March 1996) A1Google Scholar. For a technical analysis, see Appleton, B., Navigating NAFTA (Toronto: Carswell, 1994)Google Scholar.

79. Even “Canada's National Game” is becoming increasingly less Canadian. Two Canadian NHL franchises—Winnipeg and Quebec—have recently been forced by financial pressures to move to the United States; few Canadian teams are advancing into post-season play in the NHL; and few Canadians are ranked amongst its elite players.

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83. See e.g. Stoffman, J., “U.S. Scholar Will Head AGO” Toronto Star (27 May 1995) A3Google Scholar; Mays, J. B., “Misplaced Cosmopolitanism at the AGO” [Toronto] Globe and Mail (3 June 1995) C 15Google Scholar; Riley, S, “Must We Surrender Even our Galleries?” Toronto Star (3 June 1995) J8Google Scholar.

84. See generally Lorimer, R. & Duxbury, N., “Of Culture, the Economy, Cultural Production and Cultural Producers: An Orientation” (1994) 19 Canadian Journal of Communication 259.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

85. See Arthurs, H., “Mechanical Arts and Merchandise: Canadian Public Administration in the New Economy” (1997) 42:1McGill L. J. 29Google Scholar.

86. For several recent social democratic critiques, with proposed strategies to respond to globalization and continental economic integration, see Grinspun & Cameron, supra note 63.

87. Most notoriously in Ontario, see City of Toronto Act, S.O. 1997, c. 2Google Scholar (amalgamating the six constituent municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto); Fewer School Boards Act, S.O. 1997, c. 3Google Scholar (reducing the number of local school boards, and bringing educational policy and expenditure more closely under control of the provincial Ministry of Education and Training).

88. The Ontario government recently announced that it would eliminate 22—and possibly 34—of its 50 advisory agencies (including the Law Reform Commission, the Women's Directorate, the Anti-racism Directorate and the Council on University Affairs) in response to the recommendations of its Task Force on Agencies, Boards and Commissions chaired by Robert Wood, Parliamentary Assistant to the Chair of Management Board of Cabinet. According to Hon. David Johnson (Chair of Management Board of Cabinet): “As this government has said many times, in an environment of restructuring and cost reduction you've got to find new ways to do business. The same is true for our advisory agencies. Whenever possible, government will seek advice through volunteers and less formal processes. Where formal advisory agencies continue to be used as a method of consultation or advice, government will look for qualified people who are willing to serve on a voluntary business.” Ontario, Official Report of Debates (29 May 1996) at 3146Google Scholar.

89. de Sousa Santos, supra note 6.