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A MODEL OF DELIBERATIVE AND AGGREGATIVE DEMOCRACY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 February 2015

Juan Perote-Peña  and
Ashley Piggins
Juan Perote-Peña
Affiliation:
Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad de Zaragoza, Gran Vía 2, 50005 Zaragoza, Spain. Email: jperote@unizar.es
Ashley Piggins
Affiliation:
J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics and the Whitaker Institute, National University of Ireland Galway, Galway, Ireland. Email: ashley.piggins@nuigalway.ie
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Abstract:

We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. Individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is ‘truth-revealing’. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of both the original profile of judgements and the size of the electorate.

Keywords

Deliberationaggregationsocial choice theory
Type
Symposium on Individual and Social Deliberation
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 93 - 121
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 

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