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⁸ Cox, Robert, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium, 10 (1981), p. 131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹⁰ See, for example, Gilpin, Robert, ‘The Richness of Political Realism’, in Keohane, Robert (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, 1986), pp. 301–21Google Scholar.

¹¹ See, for example, Rosenthal, Joel, Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge and London, 1991)Google Scholar.

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¹³ Morgenthau, ‘Political Science’, p. 134.

¹⁴ Carr, What Is History?, pp. 1–24. There is a clear parallel with Thomas Kuhn's notion that most scientific research operates of necessity within the confines of a dominant paradigm.

¹⁵ Carr, , The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 2nd edn (London, 1946), p. 3Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See Holsti, Kal, The Dividing Discipline (Boston, 1985)Google Scholar, especially chapter 7.

¹⁷ Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp.3–4.

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²¹ Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. vii.

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³² Carr, What is History?, p. 44.

³³ T. Carlyle quoted in Carr, What is History?, p. 43.

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³⁵ Carr, What is History?, p. 144.

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⁴¹ If this rendition is sound, Carr's philosophy ends up looking something like Kant's. For both thinkers, society is moving fitfully forward to a point of stability at which lies the triumph of the individual and the full emancipation of reason. As F. H. Hinsley puts it, Kant offered us a ‘novel unilinear concept of history as continuous progress towards an end’ in which ‘reason did not develop instinctively. It required trials, experience and information in order to progress gradually from one level to the next’. Hinsley, F. H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, 1963), p. 73Google Scholar.

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⁴³ John Rawls makes the same point about the inherent stability of the just society. See Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 496–503Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Carr, What is History? p. 113.

⁴⁵ Carr, The Soviet Impact, p. 95 (emphasis in original).

⁴⁶ Carr, The Soviet Impact, p. 97.

⁴⁷ The notion of an evolutionary rationality is discussed in Hoffman, Mark, ‘Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, Millennium, 16 (1987), pp. 231–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hoffman, Mark, ‘Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory’, Millennium, 17 (1988), pp. 91–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴⁹ See, for example, the essays in Derian, James Der and Shapiro, Michael (eds.), Inlernalional/Intertextual Relations (Lexington, 1989)Google Scholar. For a useful summary of the points of divergence and convergence between these new approaches, see George, Jim and Campbell, David, ‘Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, 34 (1990), pp. 269–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ See, for example, the critique of poststructuralism in Spegele, Roger D., ‘Richard Ashley's Discourse for International Relations’, Millennium, 21 (1992), pp. 147–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵¹ Carr, The New Society, p. 105.

⁵² Notes Thomas Biersteker in this vein: ‘One important current in the post-positivist literature … views itself as taking a decidedly critical stance on international theory, opening up new possibilities, giving voice to silenced discourses. It is not pluralism without purpose, but a critical pluralism, designed to reveal embedded power and authority structures, provoke critical scrutiny of dominant discourses, empower marginalized populations and perspectives, and provide a basis for alternative conceptualizations.’ Biersteker, Thomas J., “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), p. 264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵³ Carr, What Is History?, p. 38.

⁵⁴ Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1st edn (London, 1940), pp. 277–8Google Scholar. Carr did not state explicitly the rationale behind his vote of support for appeasement. Were Hitler's opponents supposed to acquiesce permanently in the loss of Czechoslovakia or was appeasement simply a wise tactical manoeuvre, coming as it did at a time of British and French military unpreparedness? For a discussion of this point, see Fox, William T. R., ‘E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision’, Review of International Studies, 11 (1985), pp. 4–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Waltz, Theory, p. 91 (emphasis added).

⁵⁷ The need for theory that accounts for the disposition of the state apart from its structurally conditioned aspects is discussed in Wendt, Alexander, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wendt, Alexander, ‘Levels of Analysis vs. Agent and Structures: Part III’, Review of International Studies, 18 (1992), pp. 181–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Linklater, Andrew, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (London, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chapter 2.

⁵⁸ Imagery courtesy of Zacher, Mark, ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance’, in Rosenau, James and Czempiel, Ernst Otto (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1992).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Carr, The New Society, p. 107.

⁶⁰ Carr, The New Society, p. 107.

⁶¹ This is, for example, the gist of Ronald Dworkin's provocative challenge to more traditional liberals who insist on the primacy of liberty within the liberal tradition. See Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA, 1985), pp. 181–204Google Scholar.

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⁶³ Carr, The Moral Foundations’, p. 69

⁶⁴ Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, 5th edn revised (New York, 1978), p. 92Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Kennan, George, ‘Morality and American Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 64 (1985/1986), p. 206CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis in original).

⁶⁶ Carr, ‘The Moral Foundations’, p.67.

⁶⁷ On this point, Carr was influenced by Freud's idea that in matters of human conduct we must always distinguish between the conscious and unconscious motivations driving human behaviour. See Carr, The New Society, p. 72.

⁶⁸ Carr, The Soviet Impact, p. 85. See also chapters 1 and 2.

⁶⁹ Carr, Conditions of Peace, p. 7.

⁷⁰ Holsti, Kal, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order (Cambridge, 1991), p. 183CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷¹ Carr, Conditions of Peace, pp. 116–17. For a similar argument about the evolutionary function of war, see Modelski, George, ‘Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?’, International Organization, 44 (1990), pp. 18–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² Carr recognized that he might well be pilloried for portraying Nazism and Stalinism as part of a grand historical process of eventual benefit to humankind. In a 1978 interview, he defended his approach thus: ‘I am not prepared to submit to this kind of moral blackmail. After all, an English historian can praise the achievements of the reign of Henry VII without being supposed to condone the beheading of wives.’ (Carr, E. H., From Napoleon To Stalin and Other Essays (London, 1980), p. 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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⁷⁴ Carr, E. H., Studies in Revolution (London, 1950), p. 221Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ Carr, ‘The Moral Foundations’, p. 60.

⁷⁶ Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 159.

⁷⁷ Carr, Conditions of Peace, p. 75.

⁷⁸ Carr, E. H., Nationalism and After (London, 1945), pp. 67–8Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 44.

⁸⁰ Carr, ‘The Moral Foundations’, p. 71.

⁸¹ Jackson, Robert, Quasi-States: Sovereignly, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 74–5, 119–20, 131–5Google Scholar.

⁸² Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 8–10.

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⁸⁴ Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 59.

⁸⁵ Carr, Nationalism and After, pp. 38–60.

⁸⁶ This, of course, presupposes that no antithesis will arise to challenge modern liberalism, that we have, in Francis Fukayama's terms, come to the end of history. To assume this is to adopt a Eurocentric outlook. It is to suppose that revolutions in Western states established the outer bounds of possible social arrangements whose stable middle ground we have been groping towards ever since. Others writing in this vein have made the same assumption as Carr. Kant, of course, thought republican governmen t was the key to perpetual peace. More recently, George Modelski has suggested that in coming years ‘[an international] community is likely to form on the basis of shared democratic practices’ (see Modelski, ‘Is World Politics?’, p. 22).